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Expanding electricity generation is driving economic activity in the developing 
world. Increasing energy demand, largely met through the combustion of coal and natural 
gas, poses significant trade-offs between development objectives and environmental well-
being. In this dissertation I examine the Indian electricity sector. 
Chapter 1 studies the impact of regulatory changes affecting state-owned electricity 
utilities on the efficiency of coal-fired power plants.  The results indicate that the 
unbundling of generation companies from state-owned utilities improved operating 
reliability at coal-fired power plants. The improvements were, however, restricted to states 
that restructured their electricity utilities prior to the Electricity Act of 2003. The results 
also show that the reforms did not result in an improvement in thermal efficiency or capital 
utilization at these plants.  
Chapter 2 estimates the health impacts from PM2.5, SO2 and NOx emissions from 
coal-fired plants in India. I derive estimates of the total premature mortality impact from 
  
each plant in my sample associated with each of the three pollutants. I find that the majority 
of the impact, about 70%, is due to SO2 emissions—a pollutant currently unregulated in 
India due to the low sulfur content of Indian coal. I also conduct a cost benefit analysis of 
two pollution control options currently available in India—coal washing and the 
installation of an flue-gas desulfurization unit (FGD). The results from the case study show 
that both options pass the cost-benefit test using reasonable estimates of the Value of a 
Statistical Life (VSL) for India.   
Chapter 3 more thoroughly examines the benefits and costs of FGD retrofit at coal-
fired power plants in India. Using emissions estimates and output from a medium-range 
Lagrangian puff (atmospheric) model I estimate the net benefits of FGD installation for a 
sample of power plants. The results show that a substantial proportion of power plants pass 
the cost-benefit test for an FGD installation using reasonable estimates of the VSL for 
India. The results indicate a substantial scope for FGD installation to control SO2 emissions 
in the Indian power sector and suggest that it should be considered as a viable option for 
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I. Chapter 1 
The Impact of Electricity Sector Restructuring on Coal-fired 
Power Plants in India1,2 
1. Introduction 
During the past 30 years, over two dozen countries, including the US, have 
attempted to reform their electricity sectors.  Vertically integrated monopolies have been 
broken into companies that generate electricity and those that distribute it, in an attempt to 
attract independent power producers into the industry and promote competition.  Cost-of-
service regulation has been replaced by incentive-based regulation and, in some cases, by 
competitive wholesale power markets.  The ultimate goal of these reforms is to improve 
both technical and allocative efficiency in electricity generation and to pass these savings 
onto consumers.   
This paper examines the impact of electricity sector restructuring on the operating 
efficiency of thermal power plants in India. Between 1996 and 2009, 85 percent of the 
coal-based generation capacity owned by state governments was unbundled from 
vertically-integrated State Electricity Boards (SEBs) into newly created state generation 
companies. The restructuring sought to expand generation capacity and reduce costs by 
1 This is based on work jointly authored with Maureen Cropper, Alexander Limonov and Anoop Singh. I 
am the lead author of the work presented here. 




                                                 
  
encouraging the entry of independent power producers and by “corporatizing” unbundled 
generation companies. Although government owned, these companies were granted formal 
autonomy in technical, financial and managerial decisions.   I examine whether greater 
managerial discretion and specialization in generation increased operating reliability and 
thermal efficiency at unbundled power plants. 
A growing literature has documented the impacts of restructuring on the 
performance of power plants in the United States.3 Fabrizio et al. (2007) find that, in the 
short term, the restructuring did not improve technical efficiency at thermal power plants, 
but did reduce expenditure per kWh on non-fuel inputs.  Knittel (2002) suggests that power 
plants facing compensation schemes with performance incentives were more efficient than 
plants compensated on a traditional cost-plus basis.  Davis and Wolfram (2012) find that 
the selling of nuclear reactors to independent power producers led to a decrease in forced 
outages at nuclear power plants and a corresponding increase in electricity production.   
To investigate the impact of reforms in the Indian electricity sector I construct a 
panel data set of coal-based electricity generating units (EGUs) for the years 1988–2009. 
The variation in the timing of reforms across states allows me to estimate the impact of 
unbundling on EGU reliability and plant thermal efficiency. My difference-in-difference 
specification assumes that conditional on control variables—EGU/plant characteristics, 
EGU and year fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends—the assignment of the 
1A related empirical literature evaluates the impact of reforms on plant dispatch order (Douglas 2006) and 
competitive behavior in wholesale power markets (Borentstein, Bushnell,and Wolak 2002; and Hortacsu, and 




                                                 
  
timing of reforms (including not to reform) is exogenous. Under this assumption, these 
models identify the effect of reforms from a comparison of the performance of plants in 
states that unbundled with plants in states that had not yet unbundled. 
To eliminate the possibility of state-year shocks affecting my estimates of average 
treatment effects, I also present results from a triple-difference specification that uses 
EGUs operated by central government owned generation companies as an additional 
control group. These companies operate outside the purview of state governments and thus 
were not directly affected by the reorganization of the SEBs. 
My results suggest that the gains from unbundling of generation from transmission 
and distribution were limited to the states that reformed before the Electricity Act of 2003. 
In these states, on average, EGUs at state-owned plants experienced a 5 percentage point 
reduction in forced outages as result of unbundling—roughly a 25 percent reduction 
compared to the 1995 average. The decrease in forced outages was accompanied by a 6 
percentage point increase in availability. These results are driven largely by the 
improvements in operating reliability at EGUs with lower nameplate capacity. My results 
are not driven by the decommissioning of old and inefficient EGUs or a commissioning of 
new more efficient ones, thus representing an improvement at existing capacity. This is an 
important distinction as increasing reliability at existing units (improvement on the 
intensive margin) can likely be achieved more cheaply than by installing new capital 
equipment (the extensive margin).4  
4 A comparison of costs of efficiency increases on the intensive and extensive margins would help quantify 
gains. However, such data is not available. 
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On average, there is no evidence of an improvement in capacity utilization due to 
restructuring, although the results suggest a statistically significant increase at some EGUs. 
For states that unbundled prior to 2003, I find that unbundling led to a significant 
improvement in electricity generation at smaller generating units—a 9.4 percentage point 
increase in capacity utilization at 110/120 MW units. Importantly, my results show no 
evidence that unbundling of SEBs led to the improvement in thermal efficiency at state-
owned power plants.  
In summary, my analysis points to modest gains from reform. Operating reliability 
increased at EGUs in states that unbundled prior to 2003; but there is no evidence of an 
improvement in thermal efficiency. My failure to find a larger impact from restructuring 
than reported in the US may also reflect the path that reform has taken in India thus far.  In 
the United States unbundling resulted in independent power producers (IPPs) entering the 
market for generation.  This has not yet occurred on a large scale in India. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the 
Indian power sector and the nature of reforms. Section 3 describes the empirical approach 
taken.  In section 4, I discuss econometric issues.  Section 5 describes the data used in the 
study and section 6 my results. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background  
2.1 Overview of the Indian Power Sector 
Most generating capacity in India is government owned. The 1948 Electricity Supply Act 
created State Electricity Boards (SEBs) and gave them responsibility for the generation, 




operated on soft budgets, with revenue shortfalls made up by state governments. 
Electricity tariffs set by SEBs failed to cover costs, generating capacity expanded slowly 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and blackouts were common. To increase generating capacity, 
the Government of India in 1975 established the National Hydroelectric Power 
Corporation and the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), which built 
generating capacity and transmission lines that fed into the SEB systems.  In 1990, prior 
to reforms, 63 percent of installed capacity in the electricity sector in India was owned by 
SEBs, 33 percent by the central government, and 4 percent by private companies (Tongia 
2003). 
My analysis focuses on coal-fired power plants, which have, for the past two 
decades, provided approximately 70% of the electricity generated in India.5  Coal-fired 
power plants in India are, in general, less efficient than their counterparts in the US.  Over 
the period 1988-1995 the average operating heat rate—the heat input (in kcal) required to 
produce a kWh of electricity—of state-owned plants was 30 percent higher than the 
average operating heat rate of comparable plants in the United States during the period 
1960–1980 (Joskow and Schmalensee 1987).6 
The higher average operating heat rates of Indian plants are due in part to the poor 
quality of Indian coal, but also to inefficiencies in management.  The design heat rate of 
generating units that use coal with high moisture and/or high ash content is higher than for 
5 In 2009-10 (CEA 2010) 53% of installed capacity connected to the grid was coal-fired, 11% fired by 
natural gas, 23% hydro, 3% nuclear and the remainder renewables; however 70% of electricity was 
generated by coal-fired power plants. 
6 See Table 3B.  I focus on the operating heat rate of state-owned plants, as data on operating heat rate of 
central-government-owned plants are often not reported in the Central Electricity Authority’s Thermal 
Power Reports (various years).   
5 
 
                                                 
  
units with low moisture and ash content (MIT 2007).  The ash content of Indian coal is 
between 30 and 50% (Khanna and Zilberman 1999). This implies that Indian plants will 
require more energy to produce a kWh of electricity than comparable plants in the US. The 
operating heat rate of the plant may be higher than the design heat rate if the plant is poorly 
maintained or experiences frequent outages.7  Pre-reform, operating heat rates at state-
owned plants were, on average, 31% higher than design heat rates (Cropper et al. 2011).   
 State plants have, historically, been operated less efficiently than plants owned by 
the central government: they have had higher forced outages and lower capacity utilization.  
Figure 1 illustrates trends in the average percent of time state and central plants were 
available to generate electricity (plant availability), the average percent of time plants were 
shut down due to forced outages, and the average percent of time the plant was used to 
generate electricity (capacity utilization).  State power plants have, on average, had lower 
availability and capacity utilization than central-government-owned plants and higher 
forced outages throughout the 1988-2009 period.  
2.2 History of Power Sector Reforms 
Electricity sector reforms in India were prompted by the poor performance of state-
owned power plants, by large transmission and distribution losses, and by problems with 
the SEBs’ tariff structure. The tariff structure, which sold electricity cheaply to households 
and farmers and compensated by charging higher prices to industry, prompted firms to 
generate their own power rather than purchasing it from the grid, an outcome that further 
reduced the revenues of SEBs. The result was that most SEBs failed to cover the costs of 




                                                 
  
electricity production. Reform of the distribution network was necessary because of the 
extremely large power losses associated with the transmission and distribution of electric 
power—both technical losses and losses due to theft (Tongia 2003).  
Beginning in 1991, the Government of India instituted reforms to increase 
investment in power generation, reform the electricity tariff structure, and improve the 
distribution network. Under the Electricity Laws Act of 1991, IPPs were allowed to invest 
in generating capacity. They were guaranteed a fair rate of return on their investments, with 
tariffs regulated by Central Electricity Authority. The Electricity Regulatory Commissions 
Act of 1998 made it possible for the states to create State Electricity Regulatory 
Commissions (SERCs) to set electricity tariffs. States were to sign memoranda of 
understanding with the federal government, agreeing to set up SERCs and receiving, in 
return, technical assistance to reduce transmission and distribution losses and other 
benefits. The Electricity Act of 2003 made the establishment of SERCs mandatory and 
required the unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution (Singh 2006).  
There were two distinct waves of unbundling reforms in India. Table 1 shows the 
year in which the SERC became operational in each state and the year in which generation, 
transmission, and distribution were unbundled.8 The first wave, between 1996 and 2002, 
took place prior to the Electricity Reform Act of 2003. The second wave began in 2004 
and continued through the end of my sample period (2009).9 I refer to these as Phase 1 
(unbundling prior to 2003) and Phase 2 (unbundling between 2004 and 2009) states. The 
8 Table 1 lists only those states containing thermal power plants. My study focuses on coal- and lignite-
fueled plants. 
9 Assam unbundled in 2004, but its only coal-fired power plant was decommissioned in 2001-02.  I retain 
Assam in the dataset; however, for Phase 2 plants, the first year of unbundling is, effectively, 2005, the year 
in which Maharashtra unbundled.  
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remaining states (Phase 3 states) unbundled either outside of my sample period or have not 
unbundled as of 2012. 
Why did certain states restructure their electricity sectors before others? A plot of 
Table 1 on a map suggests that there is no particular geographic pattern to unbundling.  
Whether a state restructured its electricity sector is also unrelated to the financial losses it 
was suffering prior to reform or to its electricity deficit—the difference between electricity 
supply and peak electricity demand. Figure 2 plots states that unbundled before and after 
the 2003 Electricity Act (i.e., Phase 1 v. Phase 2 and 3 states) against various factors that 
might have influenced the timing of unbundling.   Panels A and B of Figure 2 show that 
there is no evidence of a relationship between either the electricity deficit in the state, pre-
reform or the losses suffered by the SEB (the ratio of revenues to costs) and the timing of 
unbundling. Panel C suggests that states with a higher proportion of renewable electricity 
generation did unbundle earlier. Renewable capacity is largely hydro power and is thus 
determined by exogenous geographical features. Panel D shows that states with lower 
subsidies to agricultural consumers (a higher ratio of agricultural to industrial tariffs) were 
also more likely to unbundle earlier.10 
2.3 Impacts of Electricity Sector Reforms 
It is important to ask how unbundling reforms might affect the operating reliability 
of plants or their thermal efficiency.  The separation of generation from transmission and 
distribution services could improve generation efficiency in several ways. Unbundling may 
result in an increase in generator efficiency from “corporatization”—plant managers being 
10 I also check whether state economic well-being (per capita income and electricity consumption) drives 
reform. I find no evidence to suggest that either of these determined the timing of unbundling reforms.  
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given greater discretionary powers to minimize costs and having to face hard budget 
constraints. Unbundling may also improve efficiency by reducing diseconomies of scope—
allowing managers to focus on decisions related solely to generation. This may result in 
more timely maintenance decisions and lead to increase generator reliability through 
reduced breakdowns and forced outages.   
The scope for such performance improvements is illustrated by comparing 
management practices at state and central government owned power plants (ESMAP 
2009).  The differences in plant availability and capacity utilization at central-government 
owned plants pre-reform (Table 3A) are due to greater forced outages and more time spent 
on planned maintenance at state plants, although capital equipment at both sets of plants 
is, on average, of the same age.  Time spent on planned maintenance can be reduced by 
better scheduling of maintenance and better inventory management. Better management of 
information can help address and avoid technical problems that result in forced outages.11 
Differences in fuel efficiency can also be driven by factors related to manpower. At 
the plant-level, Bushnell and Wolfram (2007) document differences in plant operator skill 
and effort levels that lead to significant differences in plant efficiency. While some 
processes are automated, activities such as controlling the rate at which pulverized coal is 
fed to burners, adjusting the mix of air and fuel in the mills, and operating soot blowers in 
boilers crucially depend on the plant operator’s skill and effort levels. 
11 The main technical problems at state plants identified by ESMAP (2009) include poor condition of boiler 
pressure parts due to overheating and external corrosion, poor water chemistry, poor performance of air 
pre-heaters and poor performance of the milling system. 
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The incentives for improving fuel efficiency and maintaining equipment to prevent 
breakdowns depends on how plants are compensated. Under the 2003 Electricity Act 
SERCs are to follow the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission’s (CERC’s) 
guidelines in compensating generators. The CERC compensates the power plants under its 
jurisdiction based on performance. Compensation for energy used in generation is paid 
based on scheduled generation and depends on operating heat rate. Compensation for fixed 
costs (depreciation, interest on loans and finance charges, return on equity, operation and 
maintenance expenses, interest on working capital, and taxes) is based on plant availability.  
How have SERCs actually compensated power plants? There is evidence that 
SERCs have set compensation for fuel use based on very high estimates of operating heat 
rate, suggesting that this may not provide much of an incentive for plants to improve 
thermal efficiency (Crisil Ltd. 2010).12 Compensation for fixed costs based on availability 
has occurred and is meant to prevent plants from supplying excess electricity to the grid, 
as was the case historically when plants were compensated based on capacity utilization. 
Another avenue through which reforms could influence plant reliability and thermal 
efficiency is through investment in new equipment.  Between 1995 and 2009 coal-fired 
generation capacity in India increased by 31 percent.  It increased by 45% in Phase 1 states, 
by 30% in Phase 2 states and by 5% in Phase 3 states. An important policy question is the 
extent to which reforms improved the performance of EGUs installed pre-reform versus 
12 The general focus on increasing electricity supply in the Indian electricity sector may also take away 
from the incentives to increase thermal efficiency (reduce heat rates).  
10 
 
                                                 
  
impacts that occurred through the installation of new equipment.  I test this by estimating 
models using only EGUs in operation pre-reform as well as using all EGUs. 
3. Empirical Strategy  
To examine the impact of restructuring on the operating efficiency of state owned 
power plants, I use EGU-level data on measures of operating reliability and plant-level data 
on thermal efficiency as outcome variables. Operating reliability is measured by the 
percentage of time in a year an EGU is available to generate electricity (unit availability), 
and the percentage of time a unit is forced to shut down due to equipment failures (forced 
outage).13 Thermal efficiency is measured by coal consumption per kWh and by operating 
heat rate. I also estimate the impact of reform on the capacity utilization of the EGU 
(percent of time the EGU generates electricity).  
The time variation in restructuring across states allows me to use a difference-in-
difference (DD) estimator. Figure 3 shows the proportion of EUGs in states that have 
restructured, by year. With data at the EGU-level, I estimate the impact of unbundling on 
generation efficiency controlling for time-invariant characteristics of EGUs, year fixed 
effects and linear time trends specific to each state.14 The baseline model is estimated using 
the following specification,  
 
13 The percentage of time a unit is available equals the 100 percent minus the percent of time spent on 
planned maintenance and the percent of time lost due to forced outages.  
14 Aghion et al. (2008) use similar specifications to estimate the impact of the dismantling of the licensing 
regime in India on manufacturing output. They take advantage of state and industry variation in industrial 
policy to estimate a difference-in-difference model of the incidence of delicensing on output. Besley and 





                                                 
  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∅1[𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈]𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + � 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
… (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the measure of generation efficiency for EGU i in state s in year t. In the 
thermal efficiency models, i refers to the plant, as data for operating heat rate and specific 
coal consumption are available only at the plant level. The variable of interest 
is 1[𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈]𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, a policy indicator that takes a value of 1 starting in the year after state 
s unbundles its SEB; ∅ thus estimates the average effect of the policy. A positive and 
statistically significant estimate of ∅ for unit availability and capacity utilization and a 
significant negative estimate for forced outage, specific coal consumption and heat rate is 
evidence of an average improvement in the efficiency of generation as a result of reform.  
All baseline specifications estimate the impact of reforms controlling for 
EGU/plant fixed effects, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖, and year fixed effects, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖. The inclusion of fixed effects 
controls for all time-invariant characteristics that affect the generation performance of an 
EGU or plant. The inclusion of year dummies captures macroeconomic conditions and 
changes in electricity sector policy that affect generation in the country as a whole.15 The 
upward trend in operating reliability at both state and central plants throughout the sample 
period (see Figure 1) implies that without year fixed effects estimates of the impact of 
unbundling would be overestimated.  Estimates of the effects of unbundling may also be 
biased due to differing pre-reform trends between states that restructured their SEBs and 
15 In 2003 an Unscheduled Interchange charge was instituted throughout the country to compensate (penalize) 
plants supplying unscheduled electricity to the grid when there is excess demand (supply).  
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those that did not. To control for this, the baseline specifications include state-specific time 
trends, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  
The estimated models also control for EGU and plant level characteristics that 
directly affect generation performance. The EGU models include a quadratic age term.16 
The thermal efficiency regressions include average unit capacity in the plant, the heating 
content of coal (gross calorific value per kg), the average design heat rate and a quadratic 
term in average plant age.  
To examine whether the impact of unbundling varies with the phase of unbundling, 
I estimate a variant of (1) that interacts the unbundled variable with indicators for Phase 1 
and Phase 2 states,   
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � ∅𝑘𝑘. 1[𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈]𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘=1,2
 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 +  � 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
… (2) 
 
1[𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈]𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 takes the value of 1 after unbundling of the SEB in state 𝑎𝑎 belonging to 
group k (k = Phase 1, Phase 2) and ∅𝑘𝑘 is the estimate of the impact of unbundling for state-
group k relative to the counterfactual of not having unbundled by 2009—the last year of 
the data.  
In addition to examining heterogeneous treatment effects, I test for persistence in 
reform impacts over time. To do this, I interact the unbundled variable with a set of biennial 
dummy variables post reform; these measure the impact of reform 1-2 years after reform, 
16 Other characteristics such as capacity, vintage and make of boiler/EGU also impact generation 
performance, but are time-invariant and thus subsumed by the EGU fixed-effects. 
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3-4 years after reform, and so on. Estimation of dynamic duration effects is of interest for 
two reasons. First, it is important to check whether reforms result in a persistent change in 
operating efficiency at unbundled power plants. A temporary increase in efficiency 
followed by a reversion to the mean may still yield a positive, significant average treatment 
effect in the short-term.  
Second, Wolfers (2006) points out the potential for bias in estimating average treatment 
effects when panel-specific trends are included in a difference-in-difference analysis. Since 
the average treatment effect captures the average deviation from trends in the post-
treatment period, incorrectly estimated pre-treatment trends cause the estimate to be biased. 
This problem is most severe when the estimation sample contains a relatively short pre-
treatment period. In this case, a reversal of the trend in the post-treatment period would 
have a disproportionate effect on estimates of the trend coefficients. Allowing full 
flexibility in post treatment impacts enables the trend slope coefficients to be determined 
by the pre-treatment period trends and allows me to examine the evolution of efficiency 
increases after unbundling reform.  
The estimate of dynamic effects of reform relies on the following specification,  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � � ∅𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 1[𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈]𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑘𝑘=1,2𝑖𝑖=1,3,5,..
+𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 +  � 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗
17
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
          … (3) 
In equation (3) the unbundling variable is multiplied by a set of indicator variables that 




have elapsed since the reform and ∅𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  estimates the average impact for the same time 
period.  
4. Econometric Issues and Identification 
An obvious concern in estimating the impacts of reform is that the adoption of reforms 
across states may be endogenous, thus biasing estimated impacts. Endogeneity may result 
from state officials explicitly considering potential efficiency improvements in deciding 
when to implement reforms, or from unobserved heterogeneity across states that drives 
both the decision to reform and improvements in power plant performance. If states where 
power plants were likely to gain most from reform were more likely to reform first, the 
estimated coefficient on the reform dummy would be biased upward. Alternatively, states 
with greater institutional capacity may be quicker to reform and more likely to benefit from 
it—also resulting in a positive bias. Although it is impossible to rule out all sources of bias, 
my estimation strategy and the institutional context of power sector reforms in India should 
reduce endogeneity concerns.  
First, the inclusion of EGU fixed effects controls for any time-invariant differences 
across EGUs, including factors such as state location (vis-à-vis coal mines and the 
transmission grid) and institutional capacity (which may be regarded as fixed over the 
sample period). The inclusion of state-specific time trends controls for any linear time-
varying unobserved differences across states and addresses the concern that adoption of 
reform may be associated with pre-existing trends in power plant performance.   
Second, the adoption of reform was a decision taken at the state level by bureaucrats 




state electric utilities than beliefs about generation efficiency.  Tongia (2003) cites 
opposition from the agricultural sector as a factor that delayed the adoption of reforms by 
some states, given that one objective of reforms was to reduce subsidies to agricultural 
consumers.  The political importance of agricultural constituencies may have delayed the 
adoption of even the initial stages of reform (i.e., unbundling);17 however, this is unlikely 
to bias estimates of generation efficiency.  
A third econometric concern is that the coefficient on unbundling may be capturing 
non-linear time-varying factors that are specific to the state but not related to unbundling. 
To account for this possibility I take advantage of the presence of power plants owned by 
the central government that operate in many states across the country. These power plants 
are owned and operated by the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and the 
Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC). They operate outside the structure of the SEBs and 
are thus not directly affected by restructuring.18  
To account for state-specific non-linear year shocks, I employ a triple-difference 
(DDD) specification that includes central power plants and uses state-year dummy 
variables,  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∅ 1[𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈]𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜃𝜃{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} + 𝜓𝜓{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} +  𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖  +  𝜖𝜖{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} 
          ... (4) 
17 It is not surprising that Orissa was the first state to reform, given the (un)importance of farming in the 
state. 
18 To confirm this, I conduct a falsification test to estimate the impact of state SEB unbundling on operating 




                                                 
  
In equation (4), 𝑌𝑌{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}is the outcome at EGU 𝑖𝑖 in state 𝑎𝑎 under ownership 𝑜𝑜 in year 𝑡𝑡. 
𝜃𝜃{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} represents the full set of ownership (state/central) year effects and 𝜓𝜓{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} represents the 
full set of state-year effects. The specification thus controls for time effects in each state 
and time effects for each ownership type. The estimate of the impact of unbundling, ∅, is 
identified by the variation in ownership-state-year (as compared to state-year variation that 
identifies the estimate in the DD specification).  
The DDD estimate takes the following form,  
∅{𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷} =  �Δ𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌{𝑈𝑈} −  Δ𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌{𝐵𝐵}�{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠} −  �Δ
𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌{𝑈𝑈} −  Δ𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌{𝐵𝐵}�{𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐} 
… (5) 
where ∆tY{U} is the change in the outcome post reform for states that unbundle and Δ𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌{𝐵𝐵} 
is the corresponding change for non-reforming states. The difference of these values for 
center-owned EGUs is subtracted from the difference for state-owned EGUs to obtain the 
estimate of the impact of unbundling reform.  
5. Data 
I use data from the Central Electricity Authority of India’s Performance Review of 
Thermal Power Stations (CEA various years) to construct an unbalanced panel of 385 
EGUs for the years 1988–2009.19 Of the 385 EGUs, 270 operate in 60 state-owned 
generation plants and 115 are in 23 central-government-owned plants. The units in the 
dataset constitute 83 percent of the total installed coal-fired generation capacity in the 
19 The CEA reports are not available for the years 1992 and 1993. These years are thus omitted from my 
data. A year in the dataset is an Indian fiscal year. Thus, 1994 refers to the time period April 1, 1994, 
through March 30, 1995.   
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country in the year 2009–2010.20  Additional information on the date that the SERCs were 
established, the date of the unbundling reforms for each state and ownership information 
for each power plant was obtained from the websites of the individual SERCs and the CEA.  
Tables 2A and 2B present summary statistics that compare state EGUs (Table 2A) and 
plants (Table 2B) by phase of reform in the period prior to restructuring (1988–1995) and 
at the end of the sample period (2006–2009). Tables 3A and 3B present similar 
comparisons between state and central EGUs (Table 3A) and plants (Table 3B).  
Prior to the first unbundling reforms in 1996, Phase 1 states were performing slightly 
worse than other states. The EGUs in these states were older, smaller, had higher forced 
outages, slightly lower availability and lower thermal efficiency compared to Phase 2 
states. This pattern was reversed by 2006-09: Phase 1 states were now statistically 
indistinguishable in terms of performance measures—forced outages, availability, capacity 
utilization—from Phase 2 states.21 Operating heat rate at plants in Phase 1 states was also 
slightly below operating heat rate in Phase 2 states by 2006-09, although the difference is 
not statistically distinguishable. This suggests that between 1996 and 2006 the states that 
unbundled early (Phase 1 states) outperformed the states that were just beginning to 
unbundle their SEBs in 2004 (Phase 2 states). The tables also show a drop in the average 
design heat rate of plants in Phase 1 states, which implies that at least a part of the gains in 
average performance measures are due to the addition of newer and more efficient units.  
20 Nine percent of coal-fired generation capacity in 2009-10 was privately owned.  
21 Average forced outage was lower in Phase 1 states compared to Phase 2 in the period 2006-09; however, 
the difference in means is not statistically significant. 
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The comparison between state and central plants In Tables 3A and 3B confirms that 
central plants were significantly more efficient than state plants throughout the sample 
period. Over the years 1988–1995, the average capacity utilization of state EGUs was about 
10 percentage points lower than EGUs at centrally owned plants.  Coal consumption per 
kWh was about 7 percent higher at state plants.  A comparison of operating heat rates at 
state and central plants is more difficult, as data are often missing for plants operated by 
the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC).  
During the sample period, both state and central plants improved in reliability, but 
showed little improvement in thermal efficiency.  Table 3 indicates that EGUs in both sets 
of plants have experienced large gains in capacity utilization (an average increase of 19 
percentage points for state and 25 percentage points for central plants) and smaller gains 
in plant availability (an average increase of 13 percentage points for both central and state 
plants).  Forced outages also decreased substantially at both sets of plants. There was, in 
contrast, little change in coal consumption per kWh.   
6. Results 
6.1 Difference-in-Difference Results for Thermal Efficiency 
I measure the impacts of unbundling on thermal efficiency using both specific coal 
consumption (kg/kWh) and operating heat rate (kcal/kWh).  The models are estimated 
using plant-level data.  Plants owned by the central government cannot be used as controls 
since data on thermal efficiency are often missing for these plants.   
Coal burned per kWh depends on the design heat rate of the boiler (e.g., boilers 




the heating value of the coal burned, and the age and capacity of the boiler (Joskow and 
Schmalensee 1987).  Coal consumption per kWh should decrease with the heating value of 
the coal and capacity of the boiler and should increase with boiler age.22 In estimating 
models of coal consumption I treat the heating value of the coal as exogenous to the plant. 
Given the structure of the Indian coal market, plant managers cannot choose coal quality. 
Power plants are linked to coal mines by a central government committee and thus have 
little leeway in determining the quality of the coal received.23  
Operating heat rate (OPHR) is the sum of coal burned per kWh, multiplied by the 
heating value of the coal, plus oil burned per kWh, multiplied by the heating value of the 
oil.  Although OPHR captures oil as well as coal usage, I expect the impact of unbundling 
on operating heat rate to be similar to its impact on coal consumption per kWh.24 One way 
in which restructuring could reduce coal consumption and operating heat rate are through 
the purchase of newer generating equipment. This should improve thermal efficiency 
because boilers generally deteriorate as they age and, new boilers embody technical 
improvements. It is also possible to improve thermal efficiency by pulverizing coal before 
it is burned and by performing regular maintenance of boilers.  By holding equipment age 
constant in my thermal efficiency models I focus on the change in efficiency due to 
managerial factors. 
22 Because my models are estimated at the plant level, variables measured at the level of the EGU (such as 
age) have been aggregated to the plant level by weighting each unit by its nameplate capacity. The average 
nameplate capacity is a simple average of EGU capacity in the plant. 
23 The use of washed (beneficiated) coal, which has a higher heating value, is also mandated through 
regulation and not determined by plant managers.  
24 Because coal constitutes most of the kcal used to generate electricity, OPHR ≈ (Coal per kWh)*(Heating 
Value of Coal).  It follows that the coefficient of ln(Heating Value of Coal) in the ln(OPHR) equation 
should approximately equal 1 plus the coefficient of ln(Heating Value of Coal) in the ln(Coal Consumption 
per kWh) equation.  My results confirm this. 
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Table 4 indicates that after controlling for plant characteristics, year dummy 
variables and state-level trends, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that 
unbundling improved the thermal efficiency of state-owned power plants.  Plant 
characteristics have the expected signs; however, average treatment effects in columns [1] 
and [2] show no significant impact of unbundling on operating heat rate and a significant 
positive impact on specific coal consumption. Examining the heterogeneous impacts in 
column [3] and [4] reveals that plants in Phase 2 states experience a statistically significant 
worsening in thermal efficiency post unbundling reforms—this is also what drives the 
average impact of specific coal consumption in column [2]. This result is consistent with 
large increases in specific coal consumption observed in Gujarat and Maharashtra 
beginning in 2005.  These increase could be due to idiosyncratic shocks to the quality of 
coal (e.g., to its ash and moisture content) for which I do not have data. 
My results, which show no significant improvement in thermal efficiency as a result 
of restructuring, are consistent with the results of Hiebert (2002) and Fabrizio et al. (2007).  
Hiebert find mixed effects of restructuring on the technical efficiency of coal-fired power 
plants in US states that restructured their electricity sectors (improvements in 1996 but not 
in 1997).  Fabrizio et al. (2007) find no improvement in fuel input usage at plants in states 
that restructured their electricity sectors.  It should, however, be noted that both studies 
look at the impacts of restructuring shortly after states separated generation from 





6.2 Difference-in-Difference Results for Operating Reliability 
Columns [1] and [2] of Table 5 show the average effect of unbundling of SEBs on unit 
availability and forced outage. Availability is the percentage of hours in a year that the 
EGU is available to produce electricity; forced outage is the percentage of time that the 
EGU is forced to shut down due to breakdowns and mechanical failures.  The results in 
Column [1] and [2] indicate that the average impact of unbundling on state EGUs is 
statistically insignificant from zero.  
Columns [3] and [4], however, show that states that unbundled prior to the Electricity 
Act of 2003 experienced a statistically significant improvement in operating reliability: 
average EGU availability increased by 6.8 percentage points. This increase represents a 10 
percent increase over 1995 levels. The improvements in availability were largely driven by 
a reduction in forced outages. The unbundling of generation resulted in a 5.1 percentage 
point reduction in the time lost from breakdowns, a 25 percent reduction from average 
forced outage for these states in 1995.  
Column [3] shows a decline in EGU availability in Phase 2 states due to unbundling 
that is significant at the 10 percent level, but no statistically significant impact on forced 
outages.  Because plant availability, forced outages and planned maintenance must sum to 
100 percent, this implies that the reduction in availability is due to increased plant 
maintenance. This is a very different outcome than an increase in forced outages and need 
not represent a decline in efficiency. 
An underlying assumption of the standard difference-in-difference specification is the 




specifications control for state-specific trends, I examine the whether operating reliability 
was trending similarly at EGUs across states in different phase groups prior to reform.25 
Figure A1-A3 of Appendix A compares the trends in availability, forced outage and 
capacity utilization for the period 1988-1995. The graphs suggest that the trends were 
broadly similar across the phase groups and thus are not likely to bias the estimated policy 
impact.  
Table 6 presents robustness checks for the operating reliability models.  These indicate 
that the reduction in forced outages in Phase 1 states is robust to sample specification and 
representation of time trends. For Phase 1 states the increase in EGU availability and 
reduction in forced outages is affected only slightly by dropping Phase 2 states from the 
models (i.e., to using only states that did not restructure during the sample period as a 
control group).  This is also the case when state time trends are replaced by time trends for 
the three phases of unbundling.  
Table 6 also investigates the impact of the decommissioning and commissioning of 
EGUs on my results. Columns [5] and [6] re-estimate the models dropping observations 
for the EGUs that were shut down during the sample period. This eliminates the possibility 
that units that were shut down are driving the results in Table 5.  This slightly reduces the 
impact of unbundling on forced outages and plant availability, to -3.7 and 4.9 percentage 
points, respectively. To test whether it is new EGUs that are driving the results I estimate 
the models using EGUs that were installed pre-reform and remain in the dataset through 
2009 (columns [7] and [8]).  Columns [7] and [8] suggest that unbundling significantly 
25 As the trends are estimated on both pre- and post-period data, a break in trend due to the policy change 
may implies that state-trends may not adequately control for trend differences in the pre-period. 
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improved the performance of existing equipment in Phase 1 states, reducing forced outages 
by about 5 percentage points and increasing availability by about 6 percentage points.   
As is the case for Phase 1 states, results for Phase 2 states are also robust to choice of 
sample.  The reduction in availability at Phase 2 plants remains statistically significant and 
is associated with increased restoration and maintenance of EGUs, rather than an increase 
in forced outages.  
6.3 Triple-difference Estimates of Operating Reliability   
The triple-difference (DDD) specifications include EGUs at central power plants as an 
additional control group. The validity of central power plants as a control group rests partly 
on SEB reforms having no impact on the operating reliability of these plants. To test this, 
I estimate a model of the impacts of SEB restructuring on EGUs at central power plants. 
The results, presented in Appendix A, show that there is no evidence of unbundling reforms 
on operating availability or forced outages at central EGUs—the magnitude of the 
coefficients is small and the standard errors are large.  
Table 7 presents the results from the DDD estimation of the impact of unbundling, by 
phase. The results in Table 7 are qualitatively similar to those in Table 5 for the DD 
specification. The coefficient estimates in columns [1] and [2] show a statistically 
significant increase in availability of 6 percentage points—equivalent to an additional 700 
MW becoming available for electricity production—and a decrease in forced outage for 
EGUs in Phase 1 states of 5 percentage points.  These results are robust to dropping from 
the sample units that were shut down (columns [3] and [4]). Results for Phase 2 states, 




DDD model is estimated using EGUs that were installed pre-reform and remain in the 
dataset through 2009, the impact of unbundling on forced outages is unaffected, suggesting 
that reforms improved existing capacity; however, the impact on availability is estimated 
less precisely. 
All results presented above are with standard errors clustered at the state level. This 
takes into account possible correlation in outcomes across EGUs within states and over 
time (Bertrand et al. 2004). Since all EGUs within a state are owned by the SEB of that 
state26, clustering at the state level is appropriate. However, since the number of states is 
small, the number of clusters may not be sufficient to provide consistent estimates of the 
cluster robust standard errors. In Appendix A I present the main results with clustering at 
the level of a power plant (Table A5 and A6) and clustering at the state level (Table A7) 
using wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure (Cameron et al. 2008). The results are qualitatively 
similar to those presented above and thus I proceed with state level clustering for the rest 
of the analysis.  
6.4 Dynamic Effects of the Impact of Unbundling 
The average treatment effects for units in Phase 1 states could reflect an initial 
impact of restructuring that declined over time. My analysis of the dynamic impacts of 
restructuring suggests that this is not the case.  Using equation (3), I estimate the impact of 
unbundling by interacting a series of biennial dummy variables with the unbundling 




                                                 
  
variables. Figures 4A to 4D plot the estimated coefficients of time dummy variables that 
represent two-year intervals after reform for Phase 1 states.27  
Figures 4A and 4B show a similar pattern of the impact on forced outage for both 
DD (Figure 4A) and DDD (Figure 4B) specifications. The DD coefficients are, however, 
less precisely estimated. The DDD estimates in Figure 4B suggest a lag in the reduction of 
forced outages after unbundling for Phase 1 states. The impact is significant starting 3 years 
after unbundling, and is largest 3, 5 and 9 (or more) years after reform.  
Figures 4C and 4D plot the results from a more flexible specification of the DDD 
model. Here, I allow both the pre- and post-reform time effects for state-owned EGUs to 
vary non-parametrically.28  Figure 4C shows that the flexible estimation of the pre-reform 
trend in forced outage at state-owned EGUs yields a flat trend, conditional on covariates. 
The evolution of the impact after unbundling is the same as in figure 4B above.  Figure 4D 
indicates that the significant reform impacts on availability for Phase 1 states persist for 
the duration of the sample.  
6.5 Impacts on Capacity Utilization  
Did the reductions in forced outages and increases in availability at EGUs in Phase 
1 states result in greater electricity production?  Table 8 suggests that, on average, increases 
in availability were not reflected in increased capacity utilization of state-owned EGUs. 
Column [1] and column [2] report the impacts, by phase, from the DD and DDD 
27 The dummy year categories are 1-2 years, 3-4 years, 5-6 years, 6-7 years and 9+ years since unbundling. 
The last category captures up to 13 years after unbundling in the case of Orissa. I combine years greater 
than 9 into one dummy because the number of observations is too low to estimate finer categories. 
28 This is similar to an event study specification. 
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specifications. I find no evidence to suggest that, on average, unbundling generation from 
transmission and distribution led to an increase in capacity utilization at state EGUs.   
This result is at variance with the results of Sen and Jamasb (2012) who, using state-
level data, find that unbundling resulted in a 26 percentage point increase in capacity 
utilization at state-owned power plants.  Interestingly, average capacity utilization at state-
owned EGUs increased by roughly 25 percentage points from 1991 to 2009 (see Figure 
1C).  However, once I control for plant and year fixed effects and state time trends, this 
result is unrelated to unbundling. 
One reason why increases in availability did not result in greater electricity 
generation may be that they occurred at higher cost plants. If these plants were not able to 
underbid lower cost plants in the merit dispatch order, increased availability would not 
necessarily result in increased capacity utilization. Alternatively, it could also be that there 
was heterogeneity in the impacts of unbundling on capacity utilization which caused the 
average effect to be estimated noisily.  I note that the sign of the impact of unbundling on 
average capacity utilization in Table 8 is positive but insignificant for Phase 1 states, 
suggesting this possibility.29 I examine the nature of heterogeneity in the impact of reforms 
by estimating models that allow for differential impacts by EGU size. 
Table 9 presents difference-in-difference models which interact the Phase-specific 
unbundling variable with categorical variables for 4 EGU size categories—EGUs less than 
100 MW, 110/120 MW, 210/220/250 and 500 MW.30  The results show that 110/120 MW 
29 The magnitude of the average term may be reduced due to gains in capacity utilization (or reliability) at 
some generators and possible deterioration at others—e.g. due to adjustment costs of restructuring.    
30 I define each group based on a range of nameplate capacities that is largely composed of these capacities.  
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units experienced a significant positive increase in operating reliability in Phase 1 states: 
operating availability increases by about 12 percentage points, largely driven by a 9 
percentage point reduction in time lost due to forced outages. The increase in operating 
availability translated into a roughly 9 percentage point increase in capacity utilization at 
these EGUs.  Indeed, the results in Tables 5-8 appear to be driven by reductions in forced 
outages at small (100 MW and 110/120 MW) plants. 
The estimates for Phase 2 states suggest that the impact of unbundling was to 
decrease EGU reliability. There is a statistically significant decline in availability which 
leads to a decline in capacity utilization. The estimates also show that the deterioration 
associated with reforms at EGUs in Phase 2 states is not due to an increase in forced outage. 
Thus an increase in maintenance is driving the observed decreases in availability and 
capacity utilization. As argued above, it is questionable whether this captures a reduction 
in efficiency due to reform.   
7. Conclusions 
This paper examines the impact of reforms in the Indian electricity sector on the 
generation performance of state-owned power plants. My results show that unbundling 
resulted in a statistically significant increase in the average availability of EGUs in states 
that restructured their SEBs prior to the Electricity Act of 2003. I find that the increase in 
availability at these EGUs is mainly driven by a corresponding reduction in forced outages. 
There is no evidence of an impact of restructuring on average capacity utilization or 




increase in coal consumption per kWh and in operating heat rate at state plants in states 
that unbundled between 2005 and 2009. 
Results from a triple difference specification suggest a 5.9 percentage point 
increase in average unit availability and a 4.9 percentage point reduction in forced outages 
in Phase 1 states. The reduction in forced outages represents a 25 percent reduction from 
the mean for these states in 1995. Examination of the duration of reform impacts, using a 
full set of pre and post time dummies, shows that the improvements in generation reliability 
are not reversed in the short to medium term. Robustness checks confirm that my baseline 
results are not sensitive to changes in model and sample specifications.  
The estimation of the average impact of unbundling hides the considerable 
heterogeneity in the impact of reform by EGU characteristics. Smaller EGUs experienced 
a significant increase in operating reliability due to reform in Phase 1 states.  In Phase 1 
states, 110/120 MW EGUs experienced a 9.4 percentage point increase in capacity 
utilization driven largely by a reduction in the time lost due to forced outage. The increase 
in capacity utilization represents a 24 percent increase above the 1995 average (39 percent) 
at 110/120 MW EGUs and implies an additional 2083 GWh of electricity production per 
year from these units.31   
For Phase 2 states, my results suggest that the initials years following reforms were 
associated with a reduction in availability and capacity utilization, especially at 110/120 
MW EGUs, and a decrease in thermal efficiency. The estimated coefficients are unstable 
31 State-owned thermal power plants generated 240.8 TWh (103 GWh) of electricity in 2005 (CEA 2006). 
This figure includes gas-fired plants. 
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and often insignificant, but suggest a worsening in generation performance across various 
specifications. The estimated deterioration in performance may be due to initial adjustment 
costs to restructuring in the states that were forced to unbundle.  It should also be noted 
that the reductions in availability at EGUs are due to increases in planned maintenance 
rather than increases in forced outages.  
The offsetting deterioration in Phase 2 states implies that, on average, the impact 
of reforms has been modest in magnitude.  It is safe to say that the gains from unbundling 
reforms have thus far been limited to an improvement in operating reliability and capacity 
utilization for the most inefficient plants in the states that unbundled prior to 2003. 
To the extent that I find modest impacts of restructuring on operating reliability due 
to a reduction in forced outages—and no improvements in thermal efficiency—my results 
are comparable to those of Fabrizio et al. (2007) and Davis and Wolfram (2011) for the 
US.  Fabrizio et al. (2007) do not find evidence of the impact of restructuring on the thermal 
efficiency of power plants, although they do find significant reductions in non-fuel 
expenditures. Davis and Wolfram (2011) find that deregulation and consolidation in 
ownership led to a 10 percentage point increase in operating efficiency nuclear power 
plants—driven largely by reductions in forced outages.  
My results disagree with those of Sen and Jamasb (2012) who, using state-level 
data for India, find that unbundling increased average capacity utilization by 26 percentage 
points—an extremely large effect. One possible explanation for the difference is that the 
Sen and Jamasb (2012) may not adequately control for the strong upward trend in the 




The failure to find more widespread impacts from restructuring may reflect the 
nature and progress of electricity reform in India thus far. Ruet (2005) argues that 
unbundling and subsequent corporatization has failed to increase the technical and financial 
autonomy of power plant managers to the extent envisaged at the start of reforms. 
Executive orders from state governments continue to drive some of the important decisions 
of generation companies, which may be contrary to cost-minimization objectives. 
Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) emphasize that separating generation from 
transmission and distribution is likely to be most successful when it is accompanied by 
tariff reform and when it induces competition in generation. Tariff reform that promotes 
cost recovery in the electricity sector is needed to make generation profitable. Although 
tariff reform has begun, in 2006 only 3 of the 10 states that had unbundled were making 
positive profits (The Energy and Resources Institute 2009, Table 1.80).  Another way in 
which unbundling may increase generation efficiency is through increased competitive 
pressure from the entry of IPPs into the electricity market. Such an effect followed the 









Table 1. Timeline of Reforms 




Orissa 1995 1996 
Andhra Pradesh 1999 1998 
Haryana 1998 1998 
Karnataka 1999 1999 
Uttar Pradesh 1999 1999 
Rajasthan 2000 2000 
Delhi 1999 2002 
Madhya Pradesh 1998 2002 
Phase 2 
Assam  2001 2004 
Maharashtra  1999 2005 
Gujarat  1998 2006 
West Bengal  1999 2007 
Chhattisgarh 2000 2008 
 Punjab  1999 2010 
 Tamil Nadu 1999 2010 
 Bihar  2005 a 
 Jharkhand 2003 a 







Table 2A. Variable Means, State-owned EGUs, by Unbundling Phase (EGU Data) 
  Phase-I Phase-II Phase-III     
 1988 - 1995 1988 - 1995 1988 - 1995  
  Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.  Diff. in means 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [1]-[3] [1]-[5] 
Nameplate capacity (MW) 117 73 146 74 131 60 -29*** -14*** 
Generation (GWh) 534 489 686 498 561 465 -152*** -27 
Age (yrs.) 14.8 8.0 13.5 8.2 12.9 7.5 1.3** 1.8*** 
Forced outages (%) 21.5 20.4 16.8 20.4 17.6 17.2 4.6*** 3.9** 
Planned maintenance (%) 12.2 18.7 14.2 18.7 18.3 27.4 -2 -6.1*** 
Availability (%) 66.3 23.4 69.0 23.8 64.1 26.4 -2.6* 2.2 
Capacity utilization (%) 50.0 21.2 49.8 20.7 46.0 24.0 0.2 3.9** 
  2006 - 2009 2006 - 2009 2006 - 2009     
Nameplate capacity (MW) 164 91 172 86 159 61 -8 4 
Generation (GWh) 1062 750 1052 656 1038 664 10 24 
Age (yrs.) 23.0 12.2 24.6 11.7 24.7 9.3 -1.6* -1.7* 
Forced outages (%) 10.8 14.7 12.6 16.3 13.3 18.4 -1.8 -2.5 
Planned maintenance (%) 8.2 15.6 6.1 9.8 12.6 23.1 2.1** -4.4** 
Availability (%) 81.0 19.8 81.4 18.0 74.2 27.6 -0.3 6.9*** 
Capacity utilization (%) 69.1 23.7 68.1 20.1 66.1 30.0 1 3 
Notes: Phase 1 (pre-2003): Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and Madhya Pradesh. Phase 2 (post-2003): 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh and Assam. Phase 3 (out-of-sample): Bihar, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Jharkhand. GWh, gigawatt-
hours; MW, megawatts. 1988-1995 does not contain data for 1992 and 1993. Difference in means according to a two-sample t-test with unequal 
variances*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Number of observations (1988-1995): Phase 1- 466, Phase 2- 461, Phase 3- 217. Number of observations 







Table 2B. Variable Means, State-owned EGUs, by Unbundling Phase (Plant Data) 
  Phase-I Phase-II Phase-III     
  1988-1995 1988-1995 1988-1995     
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Diff. in means 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [2]-[5] [2]-[8] 
No. of operating units 117 3.98 3.03 118 3.91 1.67 50 4.34 2.41 0.08 -0.36 
Nameplate capacity (MW) 115 473 421 117 574 383 49 580 285 -100* -107* 
Heating value of coal (kcal/kg) 58 4203 617 67 4307 604 32 3809 380 -104 394*** 
Design heat rate (kcal/kWh) 36 2633 194 41 2438 148 12 2486 70 195*** 147*** 
Operating heat rate (kcal/kWh) 59 3478 950 69 3135 537 32 3210 664 342** 268 
Specific coal cons. (kg/kWh) 98 0.83 0.15 103 0.72 0.12 49 0.82 0.13 0.11*** 0.01 
  2006-2009 2006-2009 2006-2009     
No. of operating units 86 4.64 2.76 93 3.98 1.90 44 3.52 1.73 0.66* 1.12*** 
Nameplate capacity (MW) 86 760 551 93 685 509 44 561 347 74.4 199** 
Heating value of coal (kcal/kg) 48 3547 386 45 3673 493 29 3773 334 -125 -226*** 
Design heat rate (kcal/kWh) 53 2405 177 66 2423 201 29 2383 110 -18.2 21.9 
Operating heat rate (kcal/kWh) 53 2901 642 65 2932 323 29 2777 456 -31.9 123 
Specific coal cons. (kg/kWh) 76 0.82 0.13 63 0.78 0.09 41 0.78 0.15 0.04** 0.04 
Notes: Phase 1 (pre-2003): Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and Madhya Pradesh. Phase 2 (post-2003): 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh and Assam. Phase 3 (out-of-sample): Bihar, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Jharkhand. GWh, gigawatt-
hours; MW, megawatts; kcal/kWh, kilo-calories/kilowatt-hours. 1988-1995 does not contain data for 1992 and 1993. Difference in means according to a 








Table 3A. Variable Means, by Sector (EGU Data) 
  CENTER STATE   
 1988 - 1995 1988 - 1995  
  Mean St Dev Mean St Dev  Diff. in means 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [1]-[3] 
Nameplate capacity (MW) 194 132 131 72 62.80*** 
Generation (GWh) 1046 917 602 493 443.6*** 
Age (yrs.) 13.5 10.7 13.9 8.0 -0.36 
Forced outages (%) 14.9 16.8 18.7 19.7 -3.82*** 
Planned maintenance (%) 9.4 13.9 14.2 20.7 -4.79*** 
Availability (%) 75.7 19.9 67.1 24.1 8.623*** 
Capacity utilization (%) 59.5 21.1 49.2 21.5 10.23*** 
  2006 - 2009 2006 - 2009   
Nameplate capacity (MW) 259 155 166 85 93.01*** 
Generation (GWh) 1928 1281 1054 699 873.4*** 
Age (yrs.) 20.2 12.2 23.9 11.6 -3.72*** 
Forced outages (%) 5.6 9.6 11.9 16.0 -6.36*** 
Planned maintenance (%) 5.8 5.5 8.1 15.4 -2.28*** 
Availability (%) 88.7 10.5 80.0 20.8 8.642*** 
Capacity utilization (%) 84.7 14.2 68.2 23.6 16.49*** 
Notes: GWh, gigawatt-hours; MW, megawatts. 1988-1995 does not contain data for 1992 and 1993. Difference in means between State and Central 
plants according to a two-sample t-test with unequal variances*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Number of observations (1988-1995): Center- 404, State- 







Table 3B. Variable Means, by Sector (Plant Data) 
  CENTER STATE   
 1988-1995 1988-1995  
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Diff. in means 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [2]-[5] 
No. of operating units 92 4.39 2.26 285 4.01 2.44 0.38 
Nameplate capacity (MW) 90 872 601 281 534 386 338*** 
Heating value of coal (kcal/kg) 42 4092 543 157 4167 598 -75 
Design heat rate (kcal/kWh) 12 2530 164 89 2523 185 6.73 
Operating heat rate (kcal/kWh) 43 2984 387 160 3276 751 -293*** 
Specific coal cons. (kg/kWh) 67 0.73 0.12 250 0.78 0.14 -0.05*** 
  2006-2009 2006-2009   
No. of operating units 87 5.00 2.17 223 4.14 2.28 0.86*** 
Nameplate capacity (MW) 87 1297 854 223 689 502 608*** 
Heating value of coal (kcal/kg) 11 4323 267 122 3647 424 676*** 
Design heat rate (kcal/kWh) 23 2505 137 148 2409 178 96*** 
Operating heat rate (kcal/kWh) 23 3138 398 147 2890 486 247** 
Specific coal cons. (kg/kWh) 74 0.71 0.07 180 0.80 0.12 -0.08*** 
Notes: GWh, gigawatt-hours; MW, megawatts; kcal/kWh, kilo-calories/kilowatt-hours. 1988-1995 does not contain data for 1992 and 1993. Difference 





Table 4: Thermal Efficiency - Impact of Unbundling on State Plants 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4] 
 Log Log  Log Log 
  Heat rate Specific Coal Cn.   Heat rate Specific Coal Cn. 
      
[Unbundled] 0.0320 0.0356*    
 (0.0201) (0.0189)    
[Phase-I*Unbundled]    -0.0183 -0.0107 
    (0.0229) (0.0179) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled]    0.0820*** 0.0818*** 
    (0.0223) (0.0207) 
      
ln(Design Heat Rate) 0.491*** 0.483***  0.448*** 0.444*** 
 (0.157) (0.138)  (0.133) (0.117) 
ln(Heating value of Coal) 0.514*** -0.451***  0.508*** -0.457*** 
 (0.0890) (0.0869)  (0.0834) (0.0824) 
Average Age 0.00578** 0.00786**  0.00711** 0.00908** 
 (0.00261) (0.00347)  (0.00259) (0.00339) 
Average Age^2 0.000139*** 8.20e-05  0.000120** 6.46e-05 
 (4.35e-05) (5.04e-05)  (4.45e-05) (4.91e-05) 
Average Nameplate Capacity -0.000953 -0.000572  -0.000872 -0.000498 
 (0.000698) (0.000677)  (0.000659) (0.000644) 
      
Time Trend State State   State State 
Plant FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 478 478   478 478 
Notes: Std. errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equations control for a quadratic for plant age, average 






Table 5: Operating Reliability - Impact of Unbundling on State EGUs 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4] 
  Average Impacts   Heterogeneous Impacts 
  Availability Forced Outages   Availability Forced Outages  
            
[Unbundled] 0.743 -1.824       
  (1.885) (1.352)       
[Phase-I*Unbundled]       6.793** -5.110*** 
        (2.819) (1.726) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled]       -5.559* 1.599 
        (2.993) (2.467) 
            
Time Trend State State   State State 
Unit FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Notes: Std. errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equations control for a quadratic for EGU age, year and 











Table 6: Robustness Checks - Impact of Unbundling on State EGUs 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 































(2.870) (1.740) (2.359) (1.421) (3.163) (2.047) 
1[Phase-
 
    -6.656** 1.754 -5.415* 0.987 -8.501** 1.434 
      (3.097) (2.350) (2.949) (2.583) (3.013) (2.378) 
                  
Time Trend State State Phase Phase State State State State 
Observations 2,605 2,605 4,298 4,298 3,859 3,859 2,895 2,895 
Number of id 166 166 270 270 236 236 147 147 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equations control for a quadratic for EGU age, and 
EGU and Year fixed effects. Columns [1]-[2] drop Phase 2 states from the estimation sample. Columns [3]-[4], substitute phase-wise trends instead of 
state-specific trends. Columns [5]-[6] drop units that were decommissioned during the sample period. Columns [9]-[10] drop units that were either 









Table 7: Triple Difference Estimates (DDD) - Impact of Unbundling on State EGUs 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
      Drop Shutdown Drop Enter/Exit 






              
[Phase-I*Unbundled] 5.959* -4.938** 6.284* -4.435** 7.398 -5.088** 
  (3.12) (1.818) (3.175) (1.709) (4.500) (2.203) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled] -3.684 3.104 -3.620 2.711 -4.239 1.679 
  (2.233) (2.447) (2.285) (2.419) (5.589) (6.400) 
       
Observations 6054 6054 5,541 5,541 4,024 4,024 
Number of Units 385 385 344 344 203 203 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equations control for a quadratic for EGU age, and a 











Table 8. Capacity Utilization Factor – Impact of Unbundling on EGUs 
  [1] [2] 
  Capacity Utilization 
  DD DDD 
      
[Phase-I*Unbundled] 3.955 1.101 
  (3.475) (2.789) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled] -4.039 0.571 
  (3.281) (2.133) 
      
Observations 4,298 6,054 
Number of EGUs 270 385 
Notes: Std. errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ) Estimations in both column [1] and [2], respectively, control 












Table 9: Operating Reliability by Size of EGU 
  [1] [2] [3] 
 Dependent Variable 
Interaction Variable Availability Forced Outages Capacity Utilization 
Phase-I       
[Phase-I*Unbundled] * Less than 100 MW 4.239 -5.564** 2.141 
  (3.265) (2.168) (5.033) 
[Phase-I*Unbundled] * 110/120 MW 12.26*** -9.313** 9.415** 
  (3.041) (3.518) (4.214) 
[Phase-I*Unbundled] * 200/210 MW 6.466 -2.913 2.812 
  (4.279) (1.748) (4.049) 
[Phase-I*Unbundled] *500 MW 1.169 -0.192 1.716 
  (2.178) (2.224) (3.057) 
Phase-II       
[Phase-II*Unbundled] * Less than 100 MW -6.098 3.706 1.013 
  (4.998) (4.003) (4.129) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled] * 110/120 MW -7.492** 2.764 -7.851** 
  (3.275) (4.793) (3.482) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled] * 200/210 MW -4.396 0.325 -3.514 
  (2.565) (1.487) (3.366) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled] * 500 MW -10.13*** 4.658*** -14.57*** 
  (2.358) (1.413) (2.825) 
Notes: Number of observations for all specifications=4298 (270 EGUs). Each column in Panel A and Panel B represents coefficients from a single DD 
estimation. Less than 100MW: all EGUs <100MW; 110/120MW: between 100MW and <150MW; 200/210/250MW: between 150MW and 300MW; 
and 500MW: 490 MW and above. All equations control for a quadratic for EGU age, year and EGU fixed effects and state time trends. Standard errors 




Figure 1. Trends in Outcome Variables 
Figure 1A. Trend in Availability for State and Center Owned EGUs 
 








































































Figure 2: Correlates of the Year of Unbundling across States 
Panel A: Energy deficit at peak demand in 1996 
 
Panel B: Financial well-being of SEB prior to reform 
 
Note: 1. Jharkhand and Bihar have not unbundled as of 2012. I set 2013 as their arbitrary unbundling date 
to plot the averages. (2) The red line represents the Electricity Act of 2003 which divides the first and 
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Panel C: Renewable energy capacity in 1997(Hydro and Wind) 
 
Panel D: Cross-subsidy to agriculture in 1997 
 
Note: 1. Jharkhand and Bihar have not unbundled as of 2012. I set 2013 as their arbitrary unbundling date 
to plot the averages. (2) The red line represents the Electricity Act of 2003 which divides the first and 
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Figure 4: Duration Effects 
Figure 4A: Post Treatment Flexible Duration Estimates from DD Specification 
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Figure 4C: Pre and Post Treatment Flexible Duration Estimates from DDD Specification 
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II. Chapter 2  
The Health Effects of Coal Electricity Generation in India32 
1. Introduction 
Throughout the world, thermal power plants, in addition to emitting greenhouse 
gases, are a major source of local pollution and health damages. This is especially true of 
coal-fired power plants, which generate 41 percent of the world’s electricity (IEA 2008). 
In the United States, after three decades of regulation, coal-fired power plants were 
estimated to cause between 10,000 (NRC 2010) and 30,000 (Levy et al. 2009) deaths 
annually, due to emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and directly 
emitted particulate matter (PM).33 In the United States, the benefits of further reducing 
emissions from coal-fired power plants have been thoroughly studied (Banzhaf et al. 2004; 
Levy et al. 2007; Muller and Mendelsohn 2009; USEPA 2005). The purpose of this paper 
is to shed light on the health benefits of reducing emissions from coal-fired power plants 
in India, a country where 70 percent of electricity is generated from coal. 
The regulation of power plant emissions raises several policy questions: the first is 
which pollutants should be targeted and how stringently they should be regulated. In the 
United States, regulation has focused on sulfur dioxide (SO2) to control fine particles and 
32 This is based on work jointly authored with Maureen Cropper, Shama Gamkhar, Ian Partridge and 
Alexander Limonov. 
33 The NAS figure is based on emissions in 2005. Levy et al. (2009) is based on emissions data from 1999. 
According to NRC (2010), if 2005 emissions data were used by Levy et al., the death figure would be 
approximately 30,000.  
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on nitrogen oxides (NOx) to control fine particles and reduce ground-level ozone. In India, 
environmental regulations limit particulate emissions, and two states have begun to 
establish markets to control directly emitted particulate matter.34 However there are no 
direct limitations on emissions of SO2 or NOx from coal-fired power plants.  
An important question is whether more emphasis should be placed on controlling 
SO2 and NOx. The answer to this question depends on the benefits of reducing emissions 
from these pollutants relative to the costs. To help determine this, I estimate the health 
damages associated with SO2, NOx and directly emitted fine particles (PM2.5) from 
individual power plants in India. My analysis suggests that most deaths attributable to 
power plants in India are associated with SO2, followed by NOx and directly emitted PM. 
The average number of deaths per plant associated with each pollutant in 2008 was 
approximately 392 for SO2, 127 for NOx and 56 for PM2.5. Whether this implies that more 
emphasis should be placed on controlling SO2 and NOx depends on the cost of measures to 
control these pollutants and upon how effective various measures would be in reducing 
emissions. Although I do not examine pollution control costs in detail, I provide illustrative 
calculations that suggest that scrubbers to reduce SO2 emissions are likely to pass the 
benefit-cost test at some plants. 
A second policy question is what instruments should be used to regulate pollution: 
should India rely on a cap-and-trade program, as in the United States, or on an emissions 
tax? If a pollution permit program is used, should permits trade one-for-one, or should they 
trade at ratios that reflect differences in marginal damages across plants? The answer to 
34 “India to Unveil Emissions Trading Scheme February 1,” The Economic Times, January 27, 2011. 
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this question depends on how much the damages per ton of SO2, NOx and PM2.5 vary across 
plants. In the United States, Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) argue that the efficiency of 
SO2 reduction could be increased significantly by taking differences in marginal damages 
into account. My analysis suggests that this is not the case for India. In India, the mean 
number of deaths per thousand tons of SO2 is 10, and the 5th and 95th percentile are 7 and 
11 deaths per thousand tons respectively. (The standard deviation is 2 deaths.)35 The reason 
for the small variation in damages per ton in India is that health damages depend heavily 
on population density: there is much more variation in population density across power 
plants in the United States than in India. 
To estimate the health damages associated with coal-fired power plants I have 
assembled a database of coal characteristics and usage, electricity generation and emissions 
for 92 coal-fired power plants for the years 2000–2008. I estimate the health impacts of 
directly emitted fine particles, sulfates and nitrates based on emissions for the year 2008. 
To calculate the impact of emissions on ambient air quality, I estimate intake fractions for 
each category of emissions. An intake fraction measures the change in population-weighted 
ambient concentrations of a pollutant (e.g., PM2.5) per unit of primary pollutant emitted 
from a pollution source. I estimate intake fractions using equations generated by Zhou et 
al. (2006) using Chinese data that relate the intake fraction of each pollutant to the 
population surrounding each power plant and meteorological conditions. Concentration-
response functions for fine particles from Pope et al. (2002) are used to estimate premature 
deaths associated with air emissions.  
35 The range of damages per ton of SO2 across coal-fired power plants in the United States is much greater, 
with the standard deviation of damages per ton equal to approximately half the mean (NRC 2010). 
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After characterizing the distribution of premature mortality across plants I calculate 
the reduction in mortality and cost-effectiveness of two options to reduce power plant 
emissions—washing coal to reduce ash content and installing a flue-gas desulfurization 
unit (scrubber). According to some calculations (Zamuda and Sharpe 2007), coal washing 
actually pays for itself. I calculate the health benefits and cost-per-life saved of reducing 
the ash content of coal at the Rihand power plant in Uttar Pradesh. Similar calculations are 
made for the flue-gas desulfurization unit installed at the Dahanu power plant in 
Maharashtra.  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section presents an overview of the 
Indian power sector, including a discussion of Indian coal production and the 
environmental regulations facing power plants. Section 3 describes my database and 
presents summary statistics on the thermal efficiency of power plants, characteristics of 
coal consumed and amount and intensity of pollutants emitted, by plant. The impacts of 
emissions on premature mortality are described in section 4. Section 5 summarizes the 
policy implications of my findings, and section 6 concludes.  
2. Overview of the Indian Power Sector   
In 2010, India had approximately 179 gigawatts (GW) of installed electric 
capacity.36 Table 1 shows the breakdown of installed capacity by fuel type and region. 
Coal-fired power plants accounted for 53 percent and natural gas plants for 11 percent of 
installed capacity; however, thermal power plants accounted for 83 percent of electricity 
generated (CEA 2010). Figure 1 maps the location of coal-fired capacity by state.  
36 This represents capacity connected to the grid, including 19,509 MW of captive generation. 
53 
 
                                                 
 
Most generating capacity in India is government owned. The 1948 Electricity 
Supply Act created State Electricity Boards (SEBs) and gave them responsibility for the 
generation, transmission, and distribution of power, as well as the authority to set tariffs. 
SEBs operated on soft budgets, with revenue shortfalls made up by state governments. 
Electricity tariffs set by SEBs failed to cover costs, generating capacity expanded slowly 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and blackouts were common. To increase generating capacity, the 
Government of India in 1975 established the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation 
and the National Thermal Power Corporation, which built generating capacity and 
transmission lines that fed into the SEB systems. In 1990, 63 percent of installed capacity 
in the electricity sector in India was owned by SEBs, 33 percent by the central government, 
and 4 percent by private companies (Tongia 2003). 
In 1991, legislation was passed to encourage independent power producers (IPPs) 
to enter the electricity market, in accordance with the government’s broader 
macroeconomic liberalization and privatization agenda. The Electricity Acts of 1998 and 
2003 led to the creation of a Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and 
similar regulatory bodies at the state level (the SERCs). The Acts also paved the way for 
the unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution functions; the privatization of 
distribution companies; and the restructuring of the electricity tariff structure. Currently, 
private companies (including IPPs) own 14 percent of generation capacity in India; 
however, they own a smaller share (9 percent) of coal-fired generation capacity. Thirty-
eight percent of coal-fired capacity is owned by the central government and 53 percent is 




2.1 Plant Thermal Efficiency and Coal Quality 
Coal-fired power plants in India are, in general, less efficient than their counterparts 
in the United States. Thermal efficiency is typically measured by the net output of an 
electricity generating unit expressed as percent of the heat input used (net thermal 
efficiency), or by operating heat rate—the heat input (in kcal) required to produce a kWh 
of electricity. The average net efficiency of coal-fired power plants in India is currently 
below 28 percent (see Table 5). In 2008, the U.S. coal-fired power plant fleet had a 
generation-weighted average efficiency of 32.5 percent, while the top 10 percent of the 
fleet had an efficiency of 37.6 percent, five percentage points higher (DOE 2010). The 
average operating heat rate of the coal-fired power plants in my database in 2008 (see Table 
5) is 2,856 kcal/kWh, which is 20 percent higher than the average operating heat rate of 
subcritical plants in the United States during the period 1960–1980 (Joskow and 
Schmalensee 1987). 
The higher average operating heat rates of Indian plants are due in part to the poor 
quality of Indian coal but also to inefficiencies in management. The design heat rate of 
generating units that use coal with high moisture and/or high ash content is higher than for 
units with low moisture and ash content (MIT 2007). The ash content of Indian coal is 
between 30 and 50 percent. This implies that Indian plants will require more energy to 
produce a kWh of electricity than comparable plants in the United States. The operating 
heat rate of the plant—the actual number of kcal of thermal energy required to produce a 




experiences frequent outages.37 For the 50 coal-fired power plants for which I have data in 
2008, operating heat rates are, on average, 18 percent higher than design heat rates. 
Privately owned plants have, on average, lower operating heat rates and smaller deviations 
of operating from design heat rates than do state-owned plants. 
Indian coal also has much lower heating value than coal mined in the United States 
or China. One consequence of the low heating value of Indian coal is that, ceteris paribus, 
more coal is used to produce a kWh of electricity in India than in other countries. The coal 
consumption per kWh of electricity (in kg/kWh) equals, by definition, a plant’s operating 
heat rate (kcal/kWh) divided by the heating value of its coal (kcal/kg). Ninety percent of 
the coal used to generate electricity in India is domestic coal with a heating value between 
2,700 and 4,400 kcal/kg.38 The heating value of coal mined in the eastern United States is 
between 6,000 and 7,300 kcal/kg (MIT 2007). It is lower in the western United States 
(4,600–4,700 kcal/kg) and slightly higher in China (4,600–6,000 kcal/kg) (MIT, 2007). 
The end result of higher operating heat rates and the use of coal with lower heating value 
is that approximately 770 grams of coal are burned to produce one kWh of electricity in 
India, in contrast to values half as large in the United States and China.39  
The pollution intensity of Indian power plants (i.e., grams of pollutant per kWh) 
also depends on the ash and sulfur content of the coal burned. Indian coal has high ash 
content, between 35 and 50 percent by weight, and lower sulfur content: about 0.5 percent 
37 Whenever a plant is started up after an outage, more coal is burned than during the normal operation of 
the plant. 
38 This is the range of values reported in my database for 2008. The Future of Coal (MIT 2007) reports a 
range of 3,000–5,000 kcal/kg for Indian coal. 
39 A study by Ohio State University reports 360 g/kWh for Ohio coal, with a heating value of 6,378 kcal/kg. 
A study quoted by the World Resources Institute (WRI) reports 345 g/kWh in China.  
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by weight. Based on data from the late 1990s , Garg et al. (2002) report a consumption-
weighted ash content of 45 percent; Reddy and Venkataraman (2002) report a 
consumption-weighted ash content of 39 percent. The corresponding figures for sulfur are 
0.51 percent (Garg et al. 2002) and 0.59 percent (Reddy and Venkataraman 2002). 
Information on the distribution of ash and sulfur across individual plants is more difficult 
to obtain. A chemical analysis of coal at five Indian plants in 1998 by researchers at Ohio 
State University (Ohio Supercomputer Center) revealed a range of ash contents from 26 to 
47 percent (with an average of 39 percent) and sulfur contents from 0.33 to 0.8 percent 
(average 0.48 percent). To put these numbers in perspective, the ash content of eastern U.S. 
coal in the same year ranged from 7.5 to 20 percent, and the sulfur content from 1.0 to 2.5 
percent.40 
The high ash content of Indian coal may lead to high PM emissions. Although all 
coal plants in India have electrostatic precipitators (ESPs), the high ash content of coal and 
its chemical composition reduce their removal efficiency (CPCB 2007). There is also the 
problem of fly ash disposal. Approximately 100 million tons of fly ash is generated 
annually. The ash is stored in ponds and poses a hazard to surface water sources from 
runoff and to ground water from percolation. My analysis does not quantify the health costs 
associated with fly ash disposal.   
40 Reliance on coal from the Appalachian and Illinois basins in the United States has declined over time. 
Currently, 30 percent of coal comes from the Powder River Basin in southeastern Montana and 
northeastern Wyoming. PRB coal has a sulfur content below 0.5 percent, and a lower ash (and heat) content 
than coal mined in the eastern US (MIT 2007).  
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2.2 Environmental Regulations Affecting Air Emissions  
In India, the primary responsibility for issuing and enforcing environmental 
regulations lies with the State and Central Pollution Control Boards, which fall under the 
State and Central Ministries of Environment and Forests (MoEF) (Chikkatur 2008). The 
current federal ambient air quality standards for particulates, SO2, NOx and ozone are listed 
in Table 2. The State and Central Pollution Control Boards are responsible for achieving 
ambient standards, but implementation plans similar to those in the United States are 
required only for 24 “critically polluted” areas and 17 cities (Narain 2008). 
The CPCB issues emissions regulations for highly polluting industries, including 
power plants.41 Particulate emissions are affected indirectly by coal washing requirements 
and directly by emission limits (see Table 3). Beginning in 2002, the use of coal with ash 
content exceeding 34 percent was prohibited in any thermal power plant located more than 
1,000 km from the pithead or in urban or sensitive or critically polluted areas. At the time 
the regulation was issued, it was estimated to affect approximately 24 GW of installed 
capacity.42 In practice, the standard is achieved by blending washed and unwashed coal (or 
imported coal) to reduce average ash content to 34 percent. Zamuda and Sharpe (2007) 
estimate that in 2005-2006, only 5 percent of domestic coal used in power plants was 
washed. They also note that beneficiation plants were operating at only 44 percent of 
capacity.  
41 I focus in this section on regulations that affect air emissions. Thermal power plants are also subject to 
Environmental Impact Assessments before they are built and must meet standards for the discharge of 
water used for cooling and for disposal of fly ash 
(http://www.cpcb.nic.in/divisionsofheadoffice/pci2/ThermalpowerPlants.pdf). 
42 See http://www.cpcb.nic.in/divisionsofheadoffice/pci2/ThermalpowerPlants.pdf. 
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The emission limits for total suspended particulates listed in Table 3 are 
concentration limits. Historically, they have been violated by a significant fraction of 
plants: in 2000–2001, 63 percent of plants did not comply with these standards; in 2006-
07, 28 percent of plants failed to comply (Chikkatur and Sagar 2007).  
There are no emission limits for sulfur dioxide or for nitrogen oxides for coal-fired 
power plants.43 SO2 concentrations are affected primarily by minimum stack height 
requirements and the requirement that electricity generating units of 500 MW or more leave 
space for a flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) unit (see Table 4). Generating units between 
210 and 500 MW must have stacks of at least 220 meters; units greater than 500 MW must 
have stacks at least 275 meters in height. Currently there are 3 plants in India that have 
installed flue-gas desulfurization units—Dahanu (Maharashtra), Trombay (Maharashtra) 
and Udupi (Karnataka). 
3. Emissions and Emissions Intensity of Existing Plants 
To examine the air pollution impacts of coal-fired power plants, I have constructed 
a dataset on the operating characteristics of all coal-fired plants that report to the Central 
Electricity Authority of India (CEA).44 The result is an unbalanced panel of 92 thermal 
power plants, located in 17 states, for the years 2000–2008.45 My analysis focuses on the 
43 Officials at the Central Electricity Authority report that most plants have low-NOx burners, although this 
is not required by law (CEA personal communication 2011).  
44 The CEA annually publishes the Thermal Power Review, which describes the operating characteristics of 
all state- operated thermal power plants in India and provides some data on central government and privately-
owned plants. 
45 All years in my dataset are Indian fiscal years. Thus 2000 refers to the time period April 1, 2000 through 
March 30, 2001. My data on emissions begin in 2000. Data on plant characteristics are available beginning 
in 1988 (see Chapter 1).  
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year 2008.46 In that year I have 57 state owned, 22 central government owned and 13 
privately owned plants, which constituted 88 percent of the total installed coal-fired 
generation capacity in the country.  
Table 5 presents summary statistics on operating characteristics of plants, for all 
plants and for plants by type of ownership.47 The table underscores the points made above 
regarding the thermal efficiency of coal-fired power plants and Indian coal: net thermal 
efficiency, averaged across all plants, is 27.7 percent. The average heating value of coal is 
approximately 3,625 kcal/kg; and, on average, 770 grams of coal are burned to produce 
one kWh of electricity. A comparison of operating heat rates and heating value of coal by 
ownership status is difficult, as data are often missing for privately owned plants and for 
plants operated by the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC). The table does, 
however, suggest that state owned plants consume significantly more coal per kWh than 
do private and central government plants.  
The CEA reports total suspended particulate (SPM) concentrations, measured in 
mg per normal cubic meter of flue gases (mg/Nm3) in its annual thermal power sector 
reports. Concentrations for each plant are reported as a range. Table 6 reports summary 
statistics for the upper and lower ends of this range, as well as the midpoint of the range, 
for 2008. The midpoint of the emissions range is below the 150 mg/Nm3 standard for three-
quarters of the 74 plants for which data are available. Data are not randomly missing: they 
are missing for 62 percent of private plants, 23 percent of state plants and 14 percent of 
46 All information in Tables 5–8 is based on the year 2008. Calculations based on averages for the period 
2006–2008 produced very similar results.  
47 Central plants are plants operated by the central government, including National Thermal Power 
Corporation (NTPC) plants.  
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central government owned plants. Subject to these caveats, it is clear that emission 
concentrations are, on average, lowest at privately owned plants, and lower at central 
government owned plants than they are at state owned plants. The difference in 
concentration rates between state and centrally owned plants disappears, however, once the 
vintage of generating equipment and the heating value of coal are held constant.  
A simple regression of the logarithm of the midpoint of SPM concentrations in 
flue gas on the average age of generating equipment, average age squared, heating value 
of coal and ownership dummies explains 51 percent of the variation in concentration 
rates. Concentration rates are lower the higher the heating value of coal and increase (at a 
decreasing rate) with the vintage of generating equipment. Evaluated at mean plant age, a 
one year increase in the age of electrical generating unit (EGU) raises particulate 
concentrations by about 3.5 percent. An increase in the heating value of coal by 1,000 
kcal/kg is associated with a 0.25 percent reduction in SPM concentrations. 
Concentrations are significantly lower at private plants than at state plants, but there is no 
statistically significant difference between state and centrally owned plants when age and 
heating value are held constant.  
Table 6 also presents summary statistics on annual tons of particulate matter, SO2 
and NOx emitted, as well as on the emissions intensity (in kg of pollutant per MWh) of 
these pollutants.48 To convert SPM concentration rates into tons of SPM emitted per year 
requires data on annual coal usage as well as assumptions about the volume of flue gases 
48 SO2 and NOx emissions data are missing for plants for which coal consumption data are missing. PM2.5 
emissions data are missing if either coal consumption data or SPM data are missing. 
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per ton of coal burned49. Results are presented for emissions of PM2.5, assuming a ratio of 
PM2.5/SPM of 0.8. Calculating sulfur emissions requires data on the sulfur content of coal 
as well as on coal consumption. The data on coal quality is derived from a survey of 9 
individual power plants, all owned by NTPC in various parts of the country. The average 
coal characteristics derived from this survey are used as the average of all other plants. 
The average sulfur content assumed is approximately 0.5%. My calculations of NOx 
emissions assume that all units commissioned after 1996 are installed with low-NOx 
burners. Thus, I assume a 200 ppm NOx concentration in flue gases for plants fitted with 
low-NOx burners and 300 ppm for all other plants.  
The quantity of pollutants a plant emits each year reflects the total electricity 
generated by that plant, the amount of coal it uses per kWh, and its emissions per ton of 
coal burned. Pollution intensity (i.e. quantity of pollutant per kWh generated) reflects kg 
of coal per kWh and emissions per ton of coal burned. For all three pollutants, pollution 
intensity is lower at private than at state or central government owned plants. The 
pollution intensity of SO2 emissions is, on average, higher at Indian than at U.S. coal-
fired power plants, in spite of the low sulfur content of Indian coal. The median SO2 
pollution intensity at U.S. plants in 2005 was 8.9 pounds per MWh; the mean was 12.3 
pounds per MWh (NRC 2010): at Indian plants, (see Table 6) the median SO2 intensity is 
13.4 pounds per MWh; the mean is 15.1 pounds per MWh. This reflects the smaller 
amount of coal burned per MWh in the United States and the fact that over one-quarter of 
U.S. coal-fired plants have scrubbers. The average pollution intensity of NOx emissions is 
49 The calculations are described in detail in Appendix B. 
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also higher at the plants in my database than at plants in the United States. On average, 
NOx intensity at U.S. plants in 2005 was 4.10 pounds per MWh, compared with 4.6 
pounds per MWh for Indian plants (see Table 6). 
 
4. Health Damages from Coal-Fired Power Plants 
Measuring the health effects of air pollution emissions requires estimating the 
impact of emissions on ambient air quality and using dose-response functions to relate 
population-weighted changes in concentrations to health endpoints. I estimate intake 
fractions—the change in population-weighted ambient concentrations of a pollutant—for 
directly emitted particles and for secondary sulfates and nitrates using relationships 
established by Zhou et al. (2006) for China. The resulting changes in population-weighted 
ambient concentrations are translated into premature deaths using Pope et al. (2002). 
4.1 The Intake Fraction Approach to Estimating Health Damages 
An intake fraction measures the change in population-weighted ambient 
concentrations of a pollutant (e.g., PM2.5) per unit of primary pollutant emitted from a 
pollution source. For example, if Q is emissions of PM2.5 from a power plant in grams per 
second, ΔCi is the change in ambient PM2.5 in grid cell i resulting from Q, Pi is the 
population of the grid cell and BR is the average breathing rate, then the intake fraction is 
defined as: 
 
(1)    QBRCPIF i
i




where the sum in (1) is taken over all grid cells for which ΔCi is greater than 0.50 If the 
average annual intake fraction for PM2.5 for a power plant were 1x10-5, this would mean 
that for every metric ton of PM2.5 emitted by the plant, 10 grams are inhaled by the exposed 
population.  
 The IF corresponding to an air pollution source depends on the distribution 
of population around the source, on meteorological conditions, and on characteristics of 
the source that affect {ΔCi/Q}. For power plants, source characteristics include stack 
height, stack diameter and exit velocity. Meteorological conditions include wind speed and 
direction, temperature, and the concentration of ammonia in the atmosphere.  
Rather than modeling intake fractions by running an atmospheric dispersion model 
for each power plant, I estimate intake fractions using the results of Zhou et al. (2006). 
Zhou et al. (2006) use a Lagrangian plume model (CALPUFF) to estimate the impact of 
an 800 MW coal-fired power plant with fixed design characteristics on air quality (i.e., 
{ΔCi}) in 29 locations in China. IFs are calculated for PM1, PM3, PM7, PM13, SO2, 
ammonium sulfate, and ammonium nitrate. For each pollutant, the authors regress the 
annual average intake fraction on the population in concentric annuli around each plant and 
on annual precipitation at the plant (in mm/year). The R2s range from 0.96 (for PM1) to 
0.89 (for PM13). (See Table A2 of the Appendix.) I use these equations to predict intake 
fractions for Indian power plants. (Details of this transfer are described in the Appendix.) 
50 In Zhou et al. (2006) the average breathing rate is 20 m3 per day. 
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The validity of these transfers depends on the similarity between the characteristics 
of the plant in Zhou et al. (2006) and Indian power plants.51 Zhou et al. (2006) use a plant 
with two stacks of 4 and 7 meters in diameter and 210 meters in height. Because damages 
per ton of pollutant generally decrease with stack height (Muller and Mendelsohn 2007), 
this will tend to overstate the impacts of power plants with taller stacks and underestimate 
the impacts of power plants with shorter stacks. Zhou et al. (2006) estimate the impact of 
the plant on ambient air quality using a modeling domain 3,360 km by 3,360 km. I examine 
the impact of each power plant in my database on an area that includes India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.  
 Once the intake fraction has been estimated for a particular source and 
pollutant, it can be used to calculate health impacts. Rearranging equation (1), the 
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can be calculated. In most epidemiological studies of the health effects of air pollution, the 
relative risk (RR) of death or illness associated with a change in pollutant concentration is 
given by 
(3) )exp( ∑ ∆=
i
ii CPRR β , 
51 It also depends on similarity in meteorological conditions such as wind speed and direction, which are 






                                                 
 
where β is estimated from an epidemiological study and iP  is the population, as a fraction 
of the total exposed population, that is in cell i. The associated number of cases (E) of 
premature mortality or illness is given by 
(4) BaseCasesRRRRE ∗−= )/)1(( , 
implying that (RR-1)/RR is the fraction of existing cases attributable to the source. 
4.2 Application of the Intake Fraction Approach to Indian Power Plants 
I calculate premature mortality associated with the emissions from each power 
plant, compared to no emissions, using cardiopulmonary mortality coefficients from Pope 
et al. (2002). Because Pope et al. (2002) relate premature mortality to PM2.5, I convert 
estimates of SPM to PM2.5 assuming a ratio of PM2.5 to SPM of 0.8 (USEPA AP-42). I use 
SO2 and NOx emissions for each power plant to estimate the contribution of the plant to 
sulfates and nitrates, which I add to directly emitted PM2.5.52 
4.2.1 Choice of Concentration-Response Function 
The effects of air pollution on human health include the chronic effects of long-
term exposure and the acute effects of short-term exposure. In the past two decades, a large 
number of studies—especially short-term, time-series studies—have reported 
concentration-response relationships between air pollution exposure and premature 
mortality. Long-term cohort studies provide the best method of evaluating the chronic 
effects of air pollution on human health, whereas time-series studies are appropriate for 
52 I do not consider the health impacts form ground level ozone in this analysis. Though studies in the US 
and Europe have established a link between ground level ozone and premature mortality from 
cardiovascular diseases, the impact is much smaller compared to that from PM2.5 (EPA, 2011).  
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revealing the acute effects of short-term fluctuations in pollution levels. Concentration-
response coefficients from cohort studies of premature mortality are typically several times 
higher than coefficients reported in time-series studies. It is assumed that the short-term 
effects found in time-series studies are embedded in the long-term effects on mortality rates 
derived from cohort studies. 
As of this writing, only a few time-series studies relating air pollution to mortality 
have been conducted in India (Cropper et al. 1997; Health Effects Institute 2011). The most 
recent studies—in Ludhiana, Delhi, and Chennai—are part of the Health Effects Institute’s 
Public Health and Air Pollution in Asia (PAPA) program. These studies find similar 
impacts of PM10 on daily mortality as time-series studies conducted in the United States 
(the NMMAPS (National Morbidity, Mortality, and Air Pollution Study)) and Europe (the 
APHEA project) (HEI 2011). There are, however, no studies that capture the effects of 
long-term exposure to particulate matter on mortality in India. Thus I must rely on 
concentration-response transfer.  
The prospective cohort study by Pope et al. (2002) added measurements of air 
pollution levels (fine particles in 50 cities and sulfates in 151 cities) to data on 
approximately 500,000 individuals in a prospective cohort assembled by the American 
Cancer Society. The study, which followed adults aged 30 and over, relates all-cause, 
cardiopulmonary and lung cancer mortality to annual average PM2.5 using a Cox 
proportional hazard model. Separate coefficients are reported for exposures in 1979–1983 




Transferring all-cause mortality coefficients from Pope et al. (2002) to my study 
region (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) may be inappropriate for two reasons: 
the levels of PM2.5 in the region are higher than in the United States, and the distribution 
of deaths by cause in the United States differs from the distribution in India and its 
neighboring countries. One way to deal with the former problem is to use the Pope et al. 
(2002) coefficients based on air pollution readings in the United States in the 1979–1983 
period, when average air pollution levels were higher than in the years 1999–2000. My 
analysis is based on the former coefficients. The similarity of results in time-series studies 
across cities with very different pollution readings also lends credence to my analysis. The 
second problem is handled by transferring impacts from Pope et al. (2002) by cause of 
death. The primary impact of air pollution on mortality occurs through cardiopulmonary 
mortality (ICD-9 codes 401–440 and 460–519). In the United States in 2007, 42.5 percent 
of all deaths over the age of 30 were due to cardiopulmonary causes (CDC 2011); the 
comparable figure for India in 2004 was 41.7 percent (Indiastat). I proceed with dose-
response transfer, based on the cardiopulmonary dose-response coefficient from Pope et 
al. (2002).53,54 
In interpreting the results, several points should be kept in mind: the Pope et al. 
(2002) study applies only to adults 30 years of age and older. My estimates therefore do 
not capture the impact of air pollution on child deaths.55 I also ignore the impact of air 
pollution on morbidity. In this sense, my estimates represent lower bounds to health effects. 
53 Pope et al. (2002) also find a significant impact of PM2.5 on lung cancer deaths. Lung cancer accounts for 
less than one percent of deaths over age 30 in India (Indiastat); hence I ignore this endpoint. 
54 The details on how the calculation for number of deaths attributable to each power plant are given in 
section A4 of Appendix B. 
55 Deaths occurring under the age of 30 constitute 28.8 percent of deaths in India. 
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At the same time, I calculate the impact of air pollution on premature mortality in India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Approximately 16 percent of the deaths reported 
below occur outside of India.  
4.2.2 Estimated Deaths Due to Air Pollution from Coal-Fired Power Plants   
 Table 7 presents summary statistics for the distribution of deaths 
attributable to directly emitted PM2.5, SO2 and NOx from the power plants for which 
emissions data are available. The average number of deaths associated with current 
emissions levels, compared to zero emissions, is approximately 581 per plant per year: 
approximately 392 deaths are associated with SO2, 127 with NOx and 56 with PM2.5. The 
table also presents information on the damages per ton of pollutant, which can be calculated 
for all plants. Damages per ton are, on average, greater for directly emitted PM2.5 than for 
SO2 or NOx. There are, on average, 23 deaths per 1,000 tons of PM2.5, 10 deaths per 1,000 
tons of SO2, and 9 deaths per 1,000 tons of NOx.  
Two results from Table 7 deserve emphasis: the first is that more deaths are 
attributable to SO2 emissions than to either directly emitted particulates or NOx. Although 
SO2 is associated with fewer deaths per ton than PM2.5, plants emit many more tons of SO2 
than they do of PM2.5. (Recall that all plants use electrostatic precipitators.) NOx is also 
associated with more deaths than PM2.5 for the same reason. This suggests that more 
emphasis be placed on policies to control SO2. The second is that the variation in deaths 
per ton of pollutant across plants is small: deaths per 1,000 tons of PM2.5 range from 15 
(5th percentile) to 29 (95th percentile). For SO2, they range from 7 (5th percentile) to 12 (95th 




size of the population surrounding each plant. Because I count populations 1,000 (and 
more) km from a plant—whether people live in India or elsewhere—differences in exposed 
populations across plants are not as great as in the United States. 
Table 8 shows deaths associated with air pollution broken down by plant 
ownership. While there are few differences in mean deaths per ton of pollution among 
state, center and private plants, there are significant differences in deaths per GWh. These 
reflect differences in pollution intensity across plants: private plants use, on average, less 
coal to produce a kWh of electricity and in the case of particulate emissions, they emit less 
pollution (on average) per ton of coal burned than do state- or center-owned plants. 
5. Policy Implications  
My analysis of health damages associated with power plants can be used to evaluate 
the benefits of specific pollution control options. To illustrate how it can be used, I calculate 
the benefits of two pollution abatement strategies that are not currently in widespread use 
in India: coal washing and installation of a flue-gas desulfurization unit (FGD). Although 
thermal power plants located more than 1,000 km from the pithead or in urban or sensitive 
or critically polluted areas are required to use coal containing no more than 34 percent ash 
content (CEA 2010), only 5 percent of non-coking coal is washed (Zamuda and Sharpe 
2007). I analyze the costs and benefits of using washed coal at the Rihand plant in Uttar 
Pradesh. I also calculate the benefits of installing a flue-gas desulfurization unit at the 
Dahanu power plant in Maharashtra (the only plant to have installed a scrubber) and 




5.1 Health Benefits and Costs of Using Washed Coal 
Mined coal contains unwanted mineral content. This mineral content reduces both the 
combustion efficiency of coal and increases the production of ash as a byproduct of 
combustion. Coal washing is a method commonly used to clean the coal of its unwanted 
mineral content before it reaches the power plant.56 Coal washing generally uses physical 
processes based on density or gravity separation. The coal, along with its impurities, is 
crushed and added into a liquid medium. The coal is then separated from the mineral 
content by subjecting the mixture to either gravity or centrifugal forces. 
Coal washing reduces the ash content of coal and improves its heating value: it also 
removes small amounts of other substances, such as sulfur and hazardous air pollutants.  
The use of washed coal improves the combustion efficiency of a plant (less coal needs to 
be burned to produce electricity).  Per unit of heat input, particulate and sulfur emissions 
are reduced, as are flyash disposal costs and the cost of transporting coal. Use of washed 
coal may also reduce plant maintenance costs and increase plant availability (Zamuda and 
Sharpe 2007).  
I examine the costs and benefits of using washed coal at the Rihand plant, which is 
located in a coal-mining area and is thus not currently required to use beneficiated coal. 
Rihand is a 2,000 MW plant that in 2008 produced 17,000 GWh of electricity, using coal 
with a sulfur content of 0.39 percent and an ash content of 43 percent. I assume that using 
washed coal would reduce the ash content of coal burned to 35 percent and the sulfur 
content to 0.34 percent and would raise the heating value of coal by 17 percent. Based on 
56 It is also called coal beneficiation. 
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information provided by the CEA, I calculate the levelized cost of electricity generation 
(lcoe) at Rihand using unwashed coal to be 1.206 Rs/kWh. I estimate that using washed 
coal increases the lcoe by 16.5 percent, to 1.405 Rs/kWh (see Appendix). My cost analysis 
focuses only on the yield and direct operating costs of washing. Other researchers have 
found that the use of washed coal leads to significant gains in generation plant availability 
and plant load factor and reductions in repair costs (see, for example, Zamuda and Sharpe 
2007). My estimates take no account of these economic benefits, nor of likely rail freight 
savings. 
The health benefits of coal washing (see Table 9) come from reductions in the ash 
content of coal, which reduces PM2.5 emissions, and reductions in sulfur emissions. Tons 
of PM2.5 and SO2 emitted are also reduced by the fact that less coal need be burned to 
generate electricity. Although coal washing is usually regarded as a measure aimed at 
reducing SPM emissions, my analysis indicates that benefits due to the reduction in SO2 
far outweigh those of lower PM2.5 emissions. This is particularly significant because the 
coal used at Rihand has a sulfur content of 0.39 percent, which is lower than the average 
for Indian coal. My estimates assume that NOx emissions are essentially proportional to the 
energy throughput of the boiler. The assumption of unchanged electricity generation thus 
implies unchanged emissions of NOx. 
The net impact of coal washing on mortality associated with air emissions from the 
Rihand plant is to save 251 lives. The increased cost of coal washing is Rs 3.39 billion, 




the range of estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL) for India which, conservatively 
estimated, ranges from Rs 1 million to Rs 15 million.57 
5.2 Health Benefits and Costs of a Flue-Gas Desulfurization Unit 
The Dahanu power plant in Maharashtra is currently one of three power plants fitted 
with a FGD (scrubber)58—although the MOEF stipulates that space be set aside in power 
plants with 500 MW and greater capacity to facilitate retrofitting of a FGD (see Table 4). 
The Dahanu plant is a 500 MW plant located in an environmentally sensitive area. Its SPM 
emissions are among the lowest in my database (32.5 mg/Nm3 in 2008). In 2000, the Indian 
Supreme Court ordered that an FGD be installed at the plant. 
Various scrubber technologies exist: in the United States wet scrubbing is the most 
common. The U.S. EPA’s AP-42 database indicates that a wet scrubber can achieve up to 
95 percent SO2 removal; equipment suppliers claim SO2 removal efficiencies of up to 99 
percent with additives in the flue gas stream. The Dahanu FGD is a sea water scrubber: this 
type is particularly cheap to operate but has a maximum removal efficiency of about 80 
percent.59  
Capital costs of wet scrubbers range from $100 to $200 per KW while the auxiliary 
power required for operation ranges from 1.0 to 3.0 percent of plant output, depending on 
coal sulfur level and removal level (MIT 2007). Operating costs of FGD units in the United 
57 Bhattacharya et al. (2007) report a preferred VSL estimate of Rs 1.3 million (2006 Rs) based on a stated 
preference study of Delhi residents. Madheswaran (2007) estimates of the VSL based on a compensating 
wage study of workers in Calcutta and Mumbai of approximately Rs 15 million. Shanmugam (2001) 
reports a much higher value (Rs 56 million) using data from 1990. 
58 The other two are Trombay (Maharashtra) and Udupi (Karnataka). 




                                                 
 
States average 0.16 cents/kWh60 and range up to 0.30 cents/kWh depending on sulfur level, 
removal efficiency and the costs (or potentially revenues) from disposal of sludge (MIT 
2007). My analysis of generation costs shows that the retrofitted FGD at Dahanu adds about 
9 percent to the lcoe.61 The Dahanu FGD has very low operating costs, as it employs sea 
water as the reactant to absorb SO2 rather than purchased chemicals—a design that 
obviously can be employed only for a plant at a coastal location. If the additional operations 
and maintenance (O&M) cost for a FGD is instead taken as the average figure for the 
United States, the effect is to increase the lcoe by a further 6 percent (see Appendix for 
details). 
Assuming coal with 0.5 percent sulfur content and an SO₂ removal rate of 80 percent, 
the FGD at Dahanu saves 123 lives per year, at a cost of Rs 3.55 million per life saved. An 
important question is how applicable these results are to other power plants. The costs of 
scrubbing will be higher at plants employing conventional wet scrubbers—in the 
neighborhood of 15 percent of the levelized cost of electricity (see Appendix). Benefits 
will be lower at plants burning coal with sulfur content lower than 0.5 percent. The benefits 
of installing a scrubber with an 80 percent removal rate will, however, be substantial given 
the results in Tables 7–9: at the Rihand plant, approximately 990 statistical lives would be 
saved. I also note that estimated deaths per ton of SO2 at the Dahanu plant are among the 
lowest of all plants in my database. 
60 See http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sum.html (the EIA Electric Power Annual 2009). 
61 Cost data taken from the report of a regulatory hearing before the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory 
Commission dated September 8, 2010. 
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6. Conclusions and Caveats 
The goal of this paper is to provide bottom-up estimates of the health damages 
associated with coal-fired power plants in India and the benefits of reducing emissions of 
particulate matter, SO2 and NOx at individual plants. This analysis of the health effects of 
air emissions from coal-fired power plants is a preliminary one, using intake fraction 
equations derived from power plants in China to estimate the impact of power plant 
emissions on population exposures. I also rely on concentration-response transfer from the 
United States to estimate impacts on premature mortality. Because I estimate impacts only 
for persons aged 30 and older and only for cardiopulmonary mortality, my estimates are 
lower-bound estimates of health effects. As is the case for most estimates of the health 
effects of air pollution, the weakest part of the analysis is the atmospheric chemistry linking 
changes in emissions to changes in population-weighted exposures. I believe, however, 
that some conclusions are possible from my study.  
Policies to control air pollution from Indian power plants have traditionally focused 
on reducing particulate emissions, due to the high ash content of Indian coal. The low sulfur 
content of Indian coal has, perhaps, been responsible for failure to directly control SO2 
emissions (Chikkatur and Sagar 2007). This paper suggests that more emphasis should be 
placed on direct SO2 controls. The current approach—relying on tall stacks—mirrors the 
approach taken in the United States in the 1980s to achieve local air quality standards. Tall 
stacks cause pollution to be dispersed but do not eliminate exposure, especially in a densely 
populated country. Although Indian coal has lower sulfur content than coal mined in the 
eastern United States, more coal is used to produce a kWh hour of electricity in India due 




emissions from coal-fired power plants, makes SO2 the main pollutant of concern from a 
health standpoint. 
Whether the use of FGDs to reduce SO2 emissions passes the benefit-cost test 
depends on the cost of scrubbers and on plant location. I note that the scrubber installed at 
the Dahanu plant in Maharashtra does pass this test (i.e., it has a cost-per-life-saved below 
estimates of the value of a statistical life for India), in spite of the fact that the deaths per 
ton of SO2 associated with this plant are among the lowest of the 89 plants in my database. 
Coal washing, which may pay for itself based on improved combustion efficiency and 
reduced transportation costs, also has health benefits due mainly to the lower quantity of 
coal burned per kWh generated as well as to small reductions in the sulfur content of coal 
burned. The percentage reduction in SO2 emissions due to coal washing at the Rihand plant 
(see Table 9) is 25 percent. Due to the importance of sulfates versus directly emitted PM, 
the reduction in SO2 emissions conveys more health benefits than the 30 percent reduction 
in directly emitted PM2.5.  
My estimates can also be used to calculate a lower bound to monetary damages per 
ton of PM2.5, SO2 and NOx, given appropriate estimates of the VSL for India. These 
damages could be used to calculate pollution taxes, as well as to conduct benefit-cost 





 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Generation Capacity by Fuel and Region (MW) (2009-10) 
    Thermal     Renewable   
Region Coal Gas Diesel Total Nuclear Hydro R.E.S. Total 
Northern 21275 3563 13 24851 1620 13311 2407 42189 
Western 28146 8144 18 36307 1840 7448 4631 50225 
Southern 17823 4393 939 23155 1100 11107 7939 43301 
Eastern 16895 190 17 17103 0 3882 335 21320 
N. Eastern 60 766 143 969 0 1116 204 2289 
Islands 0 0 70 70 0 0 5 75 
All India 84198 17056 1200 102454 4560 36863 15521 159399 
Note: Captive generating capacity connected to the grid = 19,509 MW 
Source: Central Electricity Authority, Ministry of Power, Government of India, New Delhi, 2010. 





Table 2. Ambient Air Quality Standards for PM, SO2 and NOx in India a 
  
Concentration in Ambient Air 
Pollutants  
Industrial,  




(notified by central 
government) 
 
Time weighted Averages  
 













Sulphur Dioxide (SO2)  80 50 80g 20g  
Nitrogen Dioxide 
(NO2)  80 40 80g 30g  
Particulate 
Matter(RPM) PM10 
  PM2.5h 










Ozoneh 180d,f 100e,f 180d,f 100 e,f  
a. National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) adopted November 18, 2009. 
b. μg/m3: microgram per cubic meter.  
c. Annual average: arithmetic mean of minimum 104 measurements in a year at a particular site 
taken twice a week 24 hourly at uniform intervals.  
d. 1-hourly 
e. 8-hourly 
f. 24-hourly, 8-hourly, or 1-hourly monitored values, as applicable, should be complied with 98 
percent of the time in a year. However, 2 percent of the time, these may be exceeded, but not on 2 
consecutive days of monitoring.   
g. Standards are applicable uniformly across residential and industrial areas, with the exception of 
these more stringent standards for NO2 and SO2 in the Ecologically Sensitive Areas. 
h. Fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and Ozone standards were added in 2009. Other new parameters, 
such as arsenic, nickel, benzene and benzo(a) pyrene have been included for the first time under 
NAAQS based on CPCB/IIT Research, World Health Organization guidelines and European 
Union limits and practices (See Department of Environment and Forests, Government of NCT of 
Delhi, 2010). 






Table 3. Particulate Emissions Standards for Coal Based Power Plants 
Capacity Pollutant Emission limit 
Coal based thermal plants 
Below 210 MW & plant 
commissioned before 1.1.82 
Particulate matter 
(PM) 350 mg/Nm3 
210 MW & above  150 mg/Nm3 
Source: Central Pollution Control Board website, accessed on April 2, 2012 
Note: The Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board and Delhi Pollution Control Committees have stipulated stringent 
standards of 115 and 50 mg/Nm3 respectively for control of particulate matter emissions.  
Table 4. Stack Height Requirements for SO2 Control 
Power Generation Capacity Stack Height (meters) 
Less than 200/210 MW 
H = 14 (Q)0.3 where Q is emission rate of SO 2 in 
kg/hr, H = Stack height in meters 
200/210 MW or 
less than 500 MW 220 
500 MW and above 275 (+ Space provision for FGD systems in future) 
  
Source: Central Pollution Control Board, Government of India. http://www.cpcb.nic.in/ Accessed on April 













Table 5. Distribution of Plant Performance Indicators 2008 
  All Plants , 2008 
        Percentile 







Nameplate (MW) 90 815 663 125 320 635 114
 
2100 





Capacity (MW) 90 806 663 125 260 630 115
 
2100 
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  State-owned Center-owned Private-owned 




Mean Median Std Dev # obs Mean Median Std 
 Nameplate 57 711 640 495 22 1341 1025 860 11 306 260 158
Age 57 21.6 20.5 11.2 22 18.4 17.7 11.9 8 27.1 24.8 15.3 
Capacity 57 697 630 493 22 1339 1025 862 11 307 260 158 
Net Generation 57 3996 2891 3384 22 9104 7398 6905 8 2327 2226 1641 
Net Efficiency 39 0.28 0.28 0.04 6 0.25 0.26 0.03 2 0.33 0.33 0.01 
Design Heat Rate 39 2405 2350 177 6 2507 2484 141 5 2301 2314 77 
Operating Heat Rate 39 2866 2770 433 6 3116 3016 410 5 2460 2454 151 
Specific Coal 
 
46 0.81 0.82 0.11 22 0.78 0.72 0.20 6 0.73 0.69 0.15 
Gross Calorific Value of 
 




Table 6. Distribution of Emissions and Emissions Intensity        
  All Plants , 2008 
        Percentile 
  # obs Mean Std Dev 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 
Min SPM recorded 75 117 118 24 65 103 132 216 
Max SPM recorded 75 207 271 61 116 143 187 535 
Mid-point SPM recorded 74 155 156 41 92 125 149 325 
PM 2.5(tons/year) 66 2580 3263 176 619 1867 2547 7682 
PM 2.5 (g/Mwh) 66 436 539 95 226 300 421 1102 
SO2 (tons/year) 74 37216 31722 3437 14501 30423 51098 104426 
SO2 (g/Mwh) 73 6860 4107 4545 5468 6111 6996 8845 
NOx (tons/year) 73 14261 11397 1833 5500 13341 19419 40085 
NOx (g/Mwh) 73 2442 540 1500 2082 2383 2788 3258 
 
  State-owned Center-owned Private-owned 
  # obs Mean Median Std Dev # obs Mean Median Std Dev # obs Mean Median Std Dev 
Min SPM recorded 49 139 122 138 20 90 84 35 6 26 26 6 
Max SPM recorded 49 254 157 324 20 127 128 51 6 88 86 32 
Mid-point SPM recorded 49 186 137 182 19 106 105 42 6 57 58 16 
PM 2.5(tons/year) 42 2892 1956 3844 19 2502 1909 1751 5 260 176 146 
PM 2.5 (g/Mwh) 42 544 376 649 19 273 253 107 5 142 101 76 
SO2 (tons/year) 46 32824 33447 22191 22 53689 39271 43488 6 10486 7960 9381 
SO2 (g/Mwh) 46 7481 6554 4929 22 5827 5749 1784 5 5693 5388 1241 
NOx (tons/year) 46 12217 11988 8848 22 20708 14628 14181 5 4700 4046 3270 






Table 7. Distribution of Deaths Attributable to Emissions—All Plants 2008 
      Percentile 
  # obs Mean Std Dev 5th 25th Median 75th 95th 
Deaths (All 
 
66 581 465 90 249 486 764 1556 
Total deaths per 
   
                
PM 2.5 66 56 76 5 14 38 63 164 
SO2 66 392 335 60 175 315 522 1124 
NOx 66 127 97 25 51 103 167 309 
Deaths per ton of 
  
                
PM 2.5 88 0.022 0.005 0.014 0.019 0.022 0.026 0.028 
SO2 88 0.010 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012 
NOx 88 0.009 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.011 
                  
Deaths (per Gwh) 66 0.095 0.033 0.054 0.075 0.090 0.105 0.140 
Total deaths (per 
    
 
                
PM 2.5 66 0.010 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.020 
SO2 66 0.063 0.023 0.037 0.051 0.061 0.070 0.090 
NOx 66 0.021 0.006 0.013 0.017 0.021 0.024 0.032 





Table 8. Distribution of Deaths Attributable to Emissions by Plant Ownership Status 2008 
  State-owned Center-owned Private-owned 
  # obs Mean Median Std Dev # obs Mean Median Std Dev # obs Mean Median Std Dev 
Capacity 57 697 630 493 22 1339 1025 862 11 307 260 158 
Total Deaths (All 
 
42 525 439 358 19 818 575 608 5 154 142 89 
Total deaths per plant 
  
                        
PM 2.5 42 61 38 90 19 58 53 41 5 6 5 4 
SO2 42 348 300 235 19 563 380 471 5 109 95 68 
NOx 42 110 103 71 19 189 158 124 5 37 40 17 
Deaths per ton of 
  
                        
PM 2.5 56 0.022 0.022 0.004 22 0.022 0.024 0.006 10 0.022 0.022 0.005 
SO2 56 0.010 0.010 0.001 22 0.010 0.010 0.002 10 0.009 0.010 0.001 
NOx 56 0.009 0.008 0.002 22 0.009 0.010 0.003 10 0.008 0.009 0.002 
             
Total Deaths (per Gwh) 42 0.101 0.094 0.037 19 0.086 0.083 0.023 5 0.076 0.073 0.025 
Total deaths (per 
    
 
                        
PM 2.5 42 0.012 0.008 0.016 19 0.006 0.006 0.003 5 0.004 0.003 0.002 
SO2 42 0.067 0.065 0.025 19 0.058 0.055 0.019 5 0.052 0.049 0.014 
NOx 42 0.022 0.021 0.006 19 0.020 0.018 0.006 5 0.020 0.021 0.008 





Table 9. Effects of Coal Washing at Rihand Thermal Power Station, 2008 
  Unwashed coal Washed coal % reduction due to washing 
Coal usage (`000 tons) 10903 9322 14% 
PM2.5 (tons/year) 1732 1207 30% 
SO2 (tons/year) 77854 58032 25% 
NOx (tons/year) 25828 25828 0% 
Total deaths (all pollutants) 1241 990 20% 
Total deaths due to       
PM2.5 43 30 30% 
SO2 934 696 25% 
NOx 264 264 0% 
Deaths (per GWh) 0.074 0.059 20% 
Total deaths (per GWh)  
  
      
PM2.5 0.0026 0.0018 30% 
SO2 0.0548 0.0409 25% 





Figure 1. Distribution of Coal-Fired Power Plant Capacity 
 
Source: Uwe Remme, Nathalie Trudeau, Dagmar Graczyk and Peter Taylor, Technology Development Prospects 
for the Indian Power Sector, Information Paper, IEA, February 2011.  
Note: Ultra mega power projects (UMPPs) are power projects planned by the Government of India to reduce power 











III. Chapter 3 
Tightening Environmental Regulation in India: An analysis of the 




The impact of SO2 and its derivative secondary sulfates on human health is well studied. 
Inhalation of fine sulfates has been linked to increased mortality risk from respiratory diseases 
including cardiopulmonary disorders and lung cancer (Pope et al. 2002). Countries such as the 
United States, which burn coal with high sulfur content have enacted regulation to limit SO2 
emissions for over 2 decades. In response, power plants subject to the regulations either switched 
to low sulfur coal or installed a flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) unit. As a result, in 2010, power 
plants with installed FGD units accounted for about 60% of the electricity generated from coal in 
the US (EIA).  
62 This research benefitted from the support of Mike Toman at the DEC-EE group of World Bank who funded the 
atmospheric dispersion modeling used in the analysis. The modeling was carried out by Sarath Guttikunda at 
UrbanEmission.Info in New Delhi, India. 
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India in contrast, currently has only three FGD units in operation and no formal restrictions on 
SO2 emissions from power plants. 63 As a result, despite the low sulfur content of Indian coal, 
health impacts from unregulated SO2 are substantially greater than those form emissions of PM2.5 
and NOx (see chapter 2). With expanding coal-based electricity generation and an increasing 
reliance on higher-sulfur imported coal there is a growing need to consider more stringent limits 
on SO2 emissions from coal fired power plants—which account for almost 50% of the SO2 
emissions in the country. 
In this paper, I examine the economics of FGD retrofits at power plants across India from a 
social planner’s perspective. Specifically, I conduct a cost-benefit analysis of installing FGD units 
at power plants at various locations in India. I construct estimates of capital and operating costs 
using information obtained from power purchase agreements and regulatory hearings. I consider 
two varieties of FGD technology that are available in the Indian market—wet limestone FGDs and 
sea water FGDs. Both technologies use different SO2 scrubbing processes and thus have different 
capital and operating costs. I compare the cost estimates to estimates of health benefits from a 
reduction in SO2 emissions. The calculation of health benefits uses results from a Lagrangian Puff 
transport model that links SO2 emissions from each power plant in my sample to population-
weighted changes in ambient sulfate concentrations.64 This is combined with a dose-response 
function transferred from Pope et al. (2002) to estimate the reduction in mortality associated with 
the change in ambient sulfate concentrations. 
63 The three FGDs are at the plants at Trombay (Maharashtra), Dahanu (Maharashtra) and Udupi (Karnataka). 
64 I consider only sulfate particles formed from SO2 emissions, and not ambient SO2 for the estimates of health 
impact. This is because secondary sulfates are responsible for the majority of the premature mortality associated 
with SO2 emissions. 
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The results show that mandatory FGD retrofit at all power plants in the sample will incur an 
average annual cost of Rs. 127 crore, and an average cost per life saved of approximately Rs. 6 
million ($109,000 at an exchange rate of 55 Rs./$). The results also identify plants and locations 
where the investment in an FGD delivers positive net benefits. They also allow me to compare 
FGD installation across geographical locations to determine where pollution control delivers the 
greatest net benefits. The net gains from FGD installation are driven by the proximity to densely 
populated areas, the size of the plant and the sulfur content of coal used65. A significant proportion 
of FGD retrofits result in a cost per life saved that lies within the range of reasonable VSL estimates 
for India. Accounting for the fact that my estimated benefits may be considered a lower bound, 
this implies that adoption of SO2 control equipment in India is economically feasible and should 
be seriously considered as a policy option.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief background of SO2 
regulation in India along with a discussion of the prevalent FGD technology options facing the 
Indian electricity sector. Section 3 describes the methodology used to construct estimates of costs 
and benefits. Section 4 discusses the results from the cost-benefit analysis and discusses policy 
implications. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background  
2.1 SO2 control in India 
Air pollution regulations on power plants in India have historically focused on restricting 
particulate emissions. This is mainly because of the characteristics of Indian coal—the primary 
65 The latter two determine the quantity of emissions from the plant in a given year. 
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fuel for electricity production in the country. Indian coal has an ash content of 45%, compared to 
about 10% for Ohio and 6.6% for Powder River Basin (PRB) coal in the United States (EIA, 2009). 
The high ash content results in a large amount of particulate pollution in the post combustion gases.  
This is emitted into the atmosphere unless captured using devices such as electrostatic precipitators 
(ESPs)66. The sulfur content of coal on the other hand is comparatively low—on average about 
0.3-0.5% by weight, which is comparable to the sulfur content of PRB coal.  
Coal-fired electricity production has been expanding rapidly in India over the past decade. 
With large unmet demand from millions of people without access to electricity the rate of 
expansion in coal-based capacity is expected to remain high in the medium term. The growing 
demand for coal from new capacity, and even from increasing capacity utilization at existing 
plants, is being met by greater imports of higher sulfur content coal from countries like Indonesia, 
Australia and South Africa.67  
The expansion in coal-based generation and coal imports has increased the pressure on 
policymakers to tighten pollution standards for SO2. In addition to minimum stack height 
restrictions (see Chapter 2), which dilute the pollutant in ambient concentrations by dispersing it 
over a wider area, the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) has also required that all new plants 
leave space in the plant for the possible retro-fitting of FGD units. According to the CEA there are 
8 power plants (both greenfield projects and expansions to existing plants) expected to be 
commissioned in the next 2-3 years with FGDs installed to control SO2 pollution (see Table 1). 
66 All coal-fired power plants in India are equipped with ESPs. 
67 Imported coal also has greater heat content per kilogram compared to domestic Indian coal. Imported coal is often 
blended with domestic coal to reduce costs compared to using only higher priced imported coal. This also reduces 
the average sulfur content depending on the ratio of the blend. 
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The expectation of tighter emissions standards for SO2 has created an interest in the FGD 
markets in India. As of this writing there are only three functioning FGDs in India. The first FGD 
installed was at the Trombay power plant, a privately owned coal and gas plant near Mumbai. The 
other plants are Dahanu (also in the state of Maharashtra) and Udupi (Karnataka). Though all three 
plants are privately owned, the FGD installation at these plants was ordered by the local 
environmental authorities or courts. 
2.2 FGD Technology 
A flue-gas desulfurization unit (FGD) or scrubber is an end-of pipe technology that removes 
SO2 from combustion gases before they exit the smokestack. The process essentially involves 
treating the flue gas with an alkaline substance that reacts with the acidic SO2 to form a by-product 
that can be removed as waste before flue gases are emitted.  
There are many different FGD technologies available for SO2 removal. The most prevalent 
one, a wet limestone FGD (wFGD), involves treating the gases with a limestone slurry, which may 
be sprayed on the gas in an absorber unit (see Figure 1). The byproduct produced is gypsum, which 
is can be sold commercially as it is used in the construction industry. Approximately 85% of the 
scrubbers installed in the US are wet scrubbers (EPA, 2004). 
Another rapidly expanding technology is sea water FGD (swFGD). These units use the 
alkalinity of sea water to remove SO2 from the flue gases. The by product is water, which is treated 




operation around the world,68 wFGD and swFGD are the two that are currently proposed for power 
plants in India.  
3. Methodology  
3.1 Sample of Plants and Data Construction 
My dataset consists of 72 coal-fired power plants (shown in figure 2) which have information 
available to calculate SO2 emissions at the plant-level.69 There are 45 plants owned by the state 
government, 22 owned by the Central government and 5 privately owned plants, with a total 
nameplate capacity of approximately 68 GW. The data, derived from the CEA, has 90 plants in 
2008, with a nameplate capacity of approximately 73 GW—96 per cent of the total installed 
capacity at coal-fired plants in that year. The 72 plants analyzed here, thus account for 
approximately 90 per cent of the total coal-fired capacity in the India in 2008. 
Table 3A shows that the average SO2 emissions for these plants was 37,727 tons in 2008. There 
is considerable variation in the emissions of SO2 across plants—from a minimum of 778 tons to a 
maximum of 188,010 tons. This is due to variation in the sulfur content of coal, plant size and 
generation. The average sulfur content of the sample is 0.53% (with a standard deviation of 
0.19%).  
For this analysis, I construct estimates of SO2 emissions based on benchmark operating 
conditions for power plants—85 per cent capacity utilization. This implies that my estimates of 
68 See DTI (2009) for a description of the various technologies of FGDs available around the world. 
69 Information on the operating characteristics of power plants was obtained from annual publications of the CEA 
(see Chapter 1 for a detailed description of the data sources). Estimates of SO2 emissions were constructed from 
information from the CEA, various sources of data on coal quality and engineering estimates of the combustion 
parameters of boilers in India (see Chapter 2 on details of emissions estimates). 
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annual tons of emissions are not affected by yearly fluctuations in operations and conform to the 
industry benchmark set by the CERC70.  
Using the estimates based on benchmark operations, I calculate deaths associated with SO2 
emissions from each plant, as described below. In conducting cost-effectiveness analyses of 
scrubber installation, I analyze the results from two subsets of power plants. First, I choose the 30 
plants that have the highest emissions of SO2 in a given year (the analysis in this paper is for the 
year 2008). The installation of FGDs in these plants would result in the greatest reduction in total 
tons of SO2 given the number of plants selected. Second, I choose the 30 plants for which SO2 
emissions are associated with the highest sulfate deaths per year. Though there is an overlap in the 
plants selected by both criteria, differences in surrounding population density and weather 
conditions cause the two samples to differ. Figures 2 and 3 show a maps of the power plants 
selected in both samples. 
Figure 2 shows the full sample of coal-fired power plants in my data. It shows that power plants 
are fairly spread out over the country, though there is some clustering of power plants close to the 
coal mines. Figure 3, shows the 30 plants with the highest annual SO2 emissions. These 30 plants 
are spread out across all but 2 states in the sample—Delhi and Assam.71 The plant with largest 
annual emissions is Ramagundem STPS, a Center owned plant, which emits approximately 170 
thousand tons of SO2 per year. The total SO2 emissions from all these plants combined is slightly 
above 2 million tons per year. Figure 4, displays the top 30 plants in terms of attributable sulfate 
deaths. These plants are mostly in densely populated areas in the northern and eastern parts on 
70 The CERC assumes a benchmark capacity utilization of 85 per cent for tariff setting. 
71 There are a total of 17 states with coal-fired power plants in India. 
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India. Farakka STPS, with 1082 deaths attributable to SO2 emissions is associated with the greatest 
amount of damages. In total, the top 30 plants are responsible for 11,700 deaths from SO2 
emissions. 
3.2  Atmospheric Dispersion Modeling  
To estimate health impacts from specific pollution sources, one needs to estimate the 
changes in ambient air quality that are attributable to emissions from those sources. This is done 
using pollution dispersion models that track the transport of pollutants though the atmosphere 
using information on weather, topography and pollutant chemistry. Dispersion models vary based 
on the amount of information they require as an input to the calculations and thus the computing 
resources that they require. 
Broadly, dispersion models may be either process-based or reduced form (NRC, 2010). 
The former use detailed atmospheric chemistry to simulate interactions among pollutants and gases 
in the atmosphere and thus accounts for non-linearity in the dispersion process.  These models 
demand substantial computing power and are very time-intensive to run; making it feasible to 
conduct only a limited number of runs. They are most often used to simulate the joint impact of 
multiple sources of pollution rather than predicting individual impacts of a large number of 
sources—as is the case here.  
Reduced form models use simplified dispersion calculations to predict concentration 
changes. These models are calibrated to fit the predictions of more complex process models while 




The model used in this analysis, ATMoS 4.0,72,73 is a reduced form Lagrangian puff transport 
model.74 Its relatively low data and computational requirements allow running the model for the 
full sample of power plants in my data. The dispersion model was run separately for each plant to 
trace the impact of primary SO2 emissions (leading to a formation of sulfate particles), emissions 
of NOx and directly emitted particulate matter on fine particle concentrations. The modeling 
domain was restricted to the political boundaries of India so as to estimate impacts within the 
country. The derived output is a source-receptor matrix for each source which enables the plant-
by-plant study of the impact of emissions.  
One concern with the use of a model like ATMoS is that it may fail to capture the non-linearity 
in the dispersion process, such as that due to the interaction of pollutants. This may be especially 
true for nitrate concentrations, formed from NOx reacting with ammonia, as ammonia reacts 
preferentially with SO2 to form sulfates. Nitrate formation would thus be affected by the 
combination of SO2 emissions and the ammonia in the atmosphere. However, in this analysis I 
focus on sulfate formation, which is roughly linear in emissions conditional on meteorological 
conditions. Further, the amount of ammonia in the atmosphere over India is sufficiently high for 
it not to be a constraint on either sulfate or nitrate formation. For these reasons, ATMoS can be 
72 The dispersion modeling for this analysis was carried out by Sarath Guttikunda at UrbanEmission.Info in New 
Delhi, India based on emissions and location data provided by the author. 
73 This model is a modified version of NOAA’s Branch Atmospheric Trajectory (BAT) model (Heffner 1983). 
Guttikunda and Calori (2009) provide some detail on the workings of the basic ATMOS 4.0 model created for 
urban-level studies. The model used in this analysis was modified for a national scale study. 
74 Lagrangian puff models mathematically track individual puff movement through the atmosphere as a random 
walk process—a Gaussian random-walk for horizontal progression in the case of ATMOS4.0. Final dispersion 
results are derived by calculating the statistics of the trajectories of multiple puffs. 
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considered to provide reasonable estimates of ambient sulfate concentration changes due to 
precursor SO2 emissions. 
A drawback of ATMOS4.0 is the limited geographical range of the modeled dispersion. The 
model is constructed to be able to track pollutant puffs when their impact on ambient 
concentrations exceed a threshold of a certain percentage of the initial size of the puff. This limits 
how far from the source pollution particles are followed. Thus, the ATMOS model is best suited 
to predict medium-range impacts of pollution—less than a 500 km radius around the source.  The 
estimated impacts in this study should therefore be regarded as a lower bound. 
3.3  Calculation of Health Benefits  
The dispersion modeling results give the change in ambient concentration of fine particles 
associated with the emissions from each plant for each 0.25 degree grid cell in the modeling 
domain. This is combined with the population of each cell from the 2011 census to calculate the 
average population-weighted ambient concentration change attributable to the annual emissions of 
SO2 from each plant.  
In comparison to Chapter 2 of this dissertation, the measurement of the population-weighted 
concentration change is restricted to India.75 Since the proportion of cardiopulmonary mortality in 
India and the United States is similar for persons over 30, I use the all-cause coefficient from Pope 
et al. (2002) in this analysis. The reported log relative risk for all-cause mortality in Pope et al. 
(2002) is 1.04, which implies a β of 0.003922 (=ln(1.04)/10).76 Using the estimated β coefficient, 
75 In chapter 2, due to the use of the IF approach, the modeling domain covered India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh.  
76 This is based on models estimated using pollution readings from 1979-83. 
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I compute the premature mortality associated with changes in sulfate concentrations for each 
power plant. The appendix (A4) of Chapter 2, gives the steps involved in the calculation of the 
health damages.  
3.4  Cost Estimates of FGD Installation and Operation in India 
The cost of FGD adoption may be divided into the capital cost of the FGD installation and 
annual operating costs. The capital costs of installation include one-time equipment purchase and 
the costs of setting up the FGD unit and connecting it to the boiler and flue stack. Based on the 
type of FGD, additional equipment, such as a limestone storage unit, mill and gypsum handling 
unit in the case of a wet limestone FGD, or water treatment in the case of a sea water FGD, also 
need to be purchased. Operating costs may be divided into fixed operating costs and variable costs. 
Fixed operating costs include periodic maintenance and labor to operate and maintain the FGD 
and accompanying equipment regardless of the degree of operation of the FGD. Variable costs 
include purchase of reagent (limestone in the case of wFGD) and by-product handling and 
disposal. Auxiliary consumption of electricity by the FGD is also part of the variable costs of 
operation.  
FGDs have been in use in power plants in the United States since the 1970s to control SO2 
emissions. Studies based on operational data available for the US show that the installation and 
operating costs of FGD units vary substantially with the size of the plant (EPA 2009; Sargent and 
Lundy 2007). Further, costs of installation increase substantially when retrofitting the FGD unit to 
an old plant, as compared with the installation of an FDG in a new plant. This is due to the fact 
that for an existing power plant, equipment has to be moved to create space for an FGD. There are 




FGD incurs a cost, on average, that is 30 percent above the cost of a newly installed FGD 
(Oskarsson et al.1997; EPA 2007) 
The sensitivity of the costs of FGD installation and operation to local labor and material 
market conditions implies that the transfer of cost estimates from the US to India is inappropriate. 
In the case of India, there are only 3 power plants where FGDs are currently operational—with the 
FGDs at Dahanu and Udupi having started operations fairly recently. With the limited experience 
of FGD operations in the Indian power sector, data on operating and installation costs is scarce.  
To construct estimates of typical FGD costs in the Indian context, I rely on information 
from a variety of regulatory documents. I obtain information from tariff orders issued by the State 
Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERC) in various states, for power plants that currently 
operate an FGD or from new projects that are planning to install one in the near future. I also use 
information from tariff determination norms and calculations of benchmark capital costs used by 
the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC).77 From this information I construct an 
estimate of the typical capital and operating costs of wet limestone and sea water FGDs in the 
Indian market.  
Table 2 shows the assumptions regarding the individual cost parameters used to construct 
the cost estimates. I assume a capital cost of Rs. 0.464 crore78/MW for a sea water FGD (MERC 
2009; and MERC 2011) and a cost of Rs. 0.6 crore/MW for a wFGD79. The greater costs for a 
77 The CERC is responsible for tariff determination for all central government owned power plants and those selling 
inter-state power. The guidelines established by the CERC are also used by individual state SERCs in their tariff 
calculations.  
78 1 crore = 10 million. Approximately $1= Rs. 55. 
79 Personal communication with an NTPC engineer. NTPC is involved in setting up a new plant in Bongaigaon, 
Assam which will have a wet limestone FGD installed. The FGD is being provided by an Indian company, BHEL. 
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limestone FGD reflect the expenditure on reagent handling and by-product disposal facilities. In 
comparison swFGD uses sea water which is discharged back into the sea thus not require as much 
capital investment. As a comparison, these figures are approximately $100-150/kW, which is in 
the ball park of wFGD price in the US, prior to the recent spike in prices (Sargent and Lundy 
2009).  
The operating cost of a typical swFGD is obtained from the data for the Dahanu power 
plant in MERC (2009). Annual operating cost in 2009 was Rs. 6.94 crore, which implies a cost of 
Rs. 0.019/kWh. The operating costs for a wFGD is assumed to be 30 per cent higher than for a 
swFGD (the same ratio as the capital costs) because of the additional equipment and input handling 
requirements. The (net) variable operating costs for both swFGDs and wFGDs are assumed to be 
negligible. For a swfGD this is because of the absence of reagent purchase and disposal costs. For 
wFGD, the sale of the by-product, gypsum, often may offset most of the variable costs of FGD 
operation (Sargent and Lundy, 2009).80 
To calculate total annual cost of an FGD, first, I calculate the levelized annual cost of 
capital. For a wFGD, this is derived from the capital cost in Rs./kWh assuming a 20 year facility 
life for retrofit units and a discount rate of 14 percent81. Next, the operating cost per unit of 
According to online sources, BHEL reports a “rule of thumb” cost estimate for a wet limestone FGD to be Rs. 0.5 
crore/MW. I take the more conservative (higher cost) estimate.  
80 Whether the revenue from the sale of gypsum offsets the costs of limestone processing, gypsum treatment and 
transportation crucially depends on regional markets for gypsum. A more accurate estimation of net variable 
operating costs for a wFGD would require ascertaining these market conditions.   
81 Sathaye and Phadke (2006) report a discount rate of 14 per cent derived from power purchase agreements of 
proposed power projects in India. 
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electricity produced (after adjusting for auxiliary power consumption) is added to the annualized 
capital cost to obtain the total annual cost of the FGD per unit of (net) electricity. 
𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 (𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎./𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘ℎ) =  
𝛿𝛿 ∗ 𝐾𝐾





 where,  
K is the fixed capital cost of installation of the FGD in Rs./kWh, 
VC is the variable cost per year expressed in Rs./kWh, 
Aux is the per cent of electricity used by the FGD and its associated equipment, 
𝛿𝛿 is the discount factor, and y is the remaining life of the power plant.  
The annual cost per unit of electricity is converted to a total cost per year using benchmark 
operation specifications82 (as used by the CERC in tariff setting) instead of actual data on capacity 
utilization and generation. This is because operating characteristics, such as capacity utilization, 
may vary from year to year. In making investment decisions planners/firms will consider 
normative operations rather than short-term fluctuations. The assumed values for the benchmarks 
are shown in Table 2. The estimated costs together with the reduction in mortality due to FGD 
installation is used to construct the cost per life saved for each power plant. 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 =
(𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡)
 (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈 𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎)
 
82 A capacity utilization factor of 85%. 
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4. Results 
The estimated emissions in this analysis are based on benchmark capacity utilization of 85 per 
cent. This assumption is used by the CERC for tariff setting and cost projections and therefore its 
use is appropriate for the calculation of long term investment decisions. Figure 5 plots the actual 
emissions and those based on benchmark capacity utilization. 
At benchmark operation specifications, the estimates of total SO2 emissions and deaths for the 
72 power plants in my data are roughly 3 million SO2 tons per year associated with 16,933 
premature deaths (Table 3B). This implies roughly 5.5 deaths per 1000 tons of emitted SO2. If 
every power plant were required to install an FGD, the average annual cost for each of the 72 
plants would be Rs. 127 crore, which gives an average cost per life saved of approximately Rs. 6 
million ($109,000 at an exchange rate of 55 Rs./$).83 This figure is within the range of reasonable 
estimates of the VSL for India of Rs. 2 million to Rs. 15 million (Bhattacharya et al. 2007, 
Madheswaran 2007). 
To prioritize power plants for installing FGDs, one may choose those with the greatest SO2 
emissions or those associated with the greatest health damages.84 Table 4 shows the summary 
results for the top 30 plants by SO2 emissions. These 30 plants jointly emit 2 million tons of SO2 
per year (about 2/3rds of the total from all 72 plants in my sample). The average baseline deaths 
associated with SO2 emissions from these plants is 335 (standard deviation of 238). There is also 
a fair amount of variation in the annualized cost of the FGD. The average cost is Rs. 250 crore 
83 This is the (lives) weighted average of cost per life saved = (total cost for all plants)/(total lives saved for all 
plants). The simple average is Rs. 7.2 million. 




                                                 
 
with a standard deviation of Rs. 102 crore.85 The cost per life saved is, on average, Rs. 6.7 
million.86 The minimum is Rs. 2.7 million per life saved and maximum is Rs. 18.4 million. The 
estimated costs are in the range of the Value of Statistical Life estimates for India—a range of Rs. 
2 million to Rs. 15 million.87 Of the 30 plants in the sample roughly 15 plants have a cost per life 
saved of less than Rs. 10 million. For the FGD installation to past the cost-benefit analysis, the 
cost per life saved must be above the appropriate VSL. Considering an arbitrary value of Rs. 10 
million for the VSL (taken from the range of Rs. 2-15 million), the installation of an FGD will 
pass the benefit-cost test for 15 plants, leading to a reduction of  6,120 deaths per year at a total 
cost of Rs. 3321 crore (thus an average cost per life saved of Rs. 5.4 million).  Figure 6 displays 
the results for deaths, emissions and cost per life saved from FGD installation. 
Table 5 shows the summary results for the 30 plants with the highest baseline sulfate deaths. 
SO2 emissions from these 30 plants are responsible for 11,721 deaths per year (roughly 59 per cent 
of the joint total baseline deaths from all 72 plants in my data). The average sulfate deaths per year 
for these 30 plants is 391 (standard deviation of 204) from an average SO2 emissions of 58,963 
tons per year per plant. The average cost per life saved is estimated to be Rs. 5.1 million per plant,88 
with a minimum of Rs. 1.6 million and a maximum of Rs. 14.7 million. Thus the cost of FGD 
installation at the most expensive of these 30 plants is below the upper bound of the VSL for India 
(Rs. 15 million). Considering again the arbitrary value of Rs. 10 million, 26 of 30 plants have a 
cost per life saved below the VSL. 
85 However, given the way that costs are constructed in this analysis, this is largely driven by variation in the size of 
the plant. 
86 This is the (lives) weighted average of the cost per life saved. The simple average is Rs. 8.6 million. 
87 There are only a few studies of VSL in India. See chapter 2 for brief discussion of VSL figures for India. 
88 Weighted average. Simple average is Rs. 5.5 million. 
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The results suggest substantial scope for the efficient adoption of FGDs by coal-fired power 
plants in India, from a social perspective. Depending on the VSL chosen, the result shows that the 
installation of FGD units at many power plants across India will result in net benefits. 
The results also help understand the factors driving the estimated cost per life saved. The cost 
per life saved is calculated as the ratio of annual FGD cost and the annual lives saved from a 
reduction in SO2 emissions (a proportion of total deaths due to sulfates). FGD costs are a function 
of the type of FGD and the size of the plant; whereas lives saved are a function of the tons of 
emissions and the exposed population around the plant.  
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 =
𝐿𝐿1(𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈)
 𝐿𝐿2(𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂2𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎, 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑈𝑈)
 
The exposed population around the plant, along with meteorological conditions, determines 
the marginal damages (deaths per ton) of emissions. Thus,  
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝐹𝐹(𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈, 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂2𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎, 𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑈𝑈) 
To examine the marginal contribution of each of the drivers of the costs and benefits of FGD 
installation, Column [1] of Table 6, displays results from the estimation of the above equation. 
Column [2] includes coal use per unit electricity and coal sulfur content as explanatory variables 
instead of tons of emissions89.  Column [3], estimates a log-log form of the equation and gives 
estimates of elasticities. The results show that the population around the plant, as proxied by the 
deaths per ton of SO2, is a strong and statistically significant predictor of the cost per life saved 
from FGD installation in India. Column [3] shows that conditional on plant size, sea water FGDs 
89 Sulfur content of coal, coal used per unit electricity and the generation together determine the tons of SO2. 
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have 27 per cent lower annual costs than wet limestone FGDs. It also shows that the elasticity of 
the cost per life saved with respect to the sulfur content of coal is -0.890. As expected, the 
coefficient on nameplate capacity is insignificant. This is because the size of the plant both 
increases cost and, all else equal, the emissions. Thus, the effect on the ratio is indeterminate. 
Figure 8 plots plants with cost per life saved less than Rs. 5 million on a map. All except 2 
plants91 are in the heavily populated northern and eastern parts of the country, confirming the 
importance of population in the vicinity of the plant as an important driver of the cost per life 
saved. Figure 9, plots the plants with estimated cost per life saved between Rs. 5 million and 10 
million. The map shows that these plants are more spread out over the rest of the country. 
5. Sensitivity 
It is important to test the sensitivity of the results to the key assumptions underlying the 
calculations. Examining the impact of changing assumptions such as average coal quality also 
helps understand the impact of future scenarios on policy effectiveness.  
With increasing imports of coal, the average sulfur content of coal used in India is likely to 
increase. I examine the how my results change if the average sulfur content of coal increased by 
50 per cent. As the dispersion of sulfur is approximately linear, the concentration changes also 
increase by 50 per cent. Table 7 shows that with a 50 per cent increase in the average sulfur content, 
emissions of 4.5 million SO2 tons per year would lead to 25,400 premature deaths. Installation of 
90 Higher sulfur content implies higher baseline emissions and (all else equal) higher deaths. Thus the lives saved 
form a proportional reduction in SO2 emissions also increases. 
91 These are: Dahanu, a large plant near Mumbai; and Kutch Lignite: a plant burning very high sulfur lignite in the 
state of Gujarat. 
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an FGD at every power plant, implies an average cost per life saved of approximately Rs. 4 million 
($73,000 at an exchange rate of 55 Rs./$).  
The estimated results are also sensitive to the choice of the dose-response coefficient. For this 
analysis I transfer the beta for the all-cause coefficient from Pope et al. (2002). If instead the 
cardiopulmonary beta is used, the estimated impact on premature mortality is 3.3 deaths per 1000 
tons of emitted SO2 or a total of 10,365 premature deaths from cardiopulmonary causes for the 72 
plants (approximately 60 per cent of the all-cause deaths estimated earlier). Installation of an FGD 
at every power plant, implies an average cost per life saved of approximately Rs. 9.8 million 
($178,000 at an exchange rate of 55 Rs./$).  
The projected capital costs for wet FGDs in India vary from 0.5 - 0.7 crore/MW. In the analysis 
above, I consider the value of 0.6 crore/MW. To examine the cost-effectiveness of FGD retrofit 
under the costliest scenario, I estimate the results assuming a capital cost of Rs. 0.7 crore/MW for 
the wet FGDs in my sample. The higher cost assumption raises the average annual cost of FGD 
operation per plant to Rs. 128 crore. This implies a cost per life saved of Rs. 6.84 million ($ 
124,000). 
6. Conclusions  
As Chapter 2 of this dissertation makes clear, there is a need in India to consider imposing SO2 
emissions standards on coal-fired power plants FGDs are the most prevalent method of SO2 
abatement in use across the world. It is thus important to assess the extent to which tighter SO2 
standard may be met by FGD installation. To inform this, I conduct a cost-benefit analysis of FGD 




The results of my analysis show that FGDs represent a viable option to reduce SO2 emissions 
in India. The estimated benefits from reduced premature mortality outweigh the costs of 
installation and operation at a significant number of coal-fired power plants. The extent to which 
FGDs pass the benefit-cost test depends crucially on the choice of the VSL. However, given the 
range of cost estimates, it is clear that there is significant scope for FGD adoption to deliver net 
benefits. 
Further, it is important to consider that the estimated benefits may be regarded as a lower bound 
to the actual benefits from reduced SO2 emissions. There are three reasons for this. First, the 
dispersion modeling used to link emissions to ambient concentration changes captures medium-
range transport only. Not accounting for long-range impacts is likely to significantly underestimate 
the health damages from power plant emissions. Second, the health impacts are restricted to 
premature mortality in the population above 30 years. Thus impacts on morbidity and child 
mortality are not considered. And third, SO2 emissions may also have an adverse impact on other 
sectors such as agriculture and forestry, which are not considered here. This analysis may be also 
be further refined as more data become available on FGD operations in India and more recent VSL 







Table 1. FGD Units in India - Planned and Operational 
Location Company State Status of FGD Capacity Manufacturer Type 
Trombay TATA Power Maharashtra Operating Unit 5: 500MW ABB Sea water 
Trombay TATA Power Maharashtra  Planned Unit 8: 250MW   Sea water 
Ratnagiri JSW Maharashtra Under construction 1200 MW  (4 x 300) Alstom Sea water 
Udupi LANCO Karnataka Operating 1200 MW (2 x 600) Ducon 
Wet 
Limetsone 
Dahanu RELIANCE Maharashtra Operating 500 MW Ducon Sea water 
Bongaigaon NTPC Assam Under construction 750 MW BHEL Wet Limetsone 
Vindhyachal-stage V NTPC Madhya Pradesh Planned 500 MW BHEL Wet Limestone 








Table 2. Operating Characteristics for Cost Calculations – Baseline Assumptions 
  Units Benchmark 
PLF % 85 
Capital Discount Rate % 14 
Plant Life (retrofit) Years 20 years 
    FGD Type 
    Wet Limestone Sea Water 
Capital Costs Rs. Crore/MW 0.600 0.464 
Fixed Operating Costs Rs./kWh 0.025 0.019 
Variable Operating Costs Rs./kWh 0 0 
Auxiliary Consumption % 1.5 1.25 
FGD Efficiency % 90 90 
Retrofit Cost Factor % 30 30 
Note: (1) 1 crore = 10 million. (2) The capital cost above does not represent the retrofit cost factor as it is derived from information for costs at Dahanu 










Table 3A. Summary Statistics – Actual Operations (2008) 
  Average Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 948 674 840 63 3260 
Generation (GWh) 6393 5446 5305 103 26601 
Capacity utilization (%) 75 20 79 11 101 
Sulfur content of coal (%) 0.53 0.19 0.5 0.21 2.00 
SO2 emissions (tons/yr) 37727 31857 30423 778 188010 
Note: (1) Number of observations = 72 power plants. (2) Data based on actual operations for the year 2008. 
 
 
Table 3B. Summary Statistics – Benchmark Operations 
  Average Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
SO2 emissions (tons/yr) 42678 30557 36405 2704 169192 
Sulfate Deaths 235 189 176 6 1083 
Sulfate Deaths per GWh 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.13 
Capital Costs (Rs. crore) 729 530 655 49 2543 
Annualized Capital Cost (Rs. crore) 110 80 99 7 384 
Operating Costs – Fixed (Rs. crore) 17 12 15 1 59 
Total Annual Cost (Rs. crore) 127 92 114 8 443 
Cost per Life Saved (Rs. million) 6.0* 4.83 6.12 1.56 31.74 
*Is calculated as the (total cost)/(total number of lives saved). Simple average is Rs. 7.2 million. Note: (1) Number of observations = 72 power plants. 






Table 4. Summary Statistics - 30 Plants with Highest SO2 Emissions (Tons/Year) 
  Average Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 1509 613 1340 840 3260 
Generation (GWh) 10392 5571 9238 1014 26601 
Sulfur content of coal (%) 0.52 0.11 0.50 0.30 0.89 
SO2 emissions (tons/yr) 69564 29012 61436 41808 169192 
Sulfate Deaths per GWh 0.031 0.021 0.021 0.013 0.091 
Based on assumption of Benchmark Operations         
Sulfate Deaths 335 238 294 96 1083 
Capital Costs (Rs. crore) 1165 490 1045 603 2543 
Annualized Capital Cost (Rs. crore) 176 74 158 91 384 
Operating Costs – Fixed (Rs. crore) 27 11 24 14 59 
Total Annual Cost (Rs. crore) 203 85 182 105 443 
Cost per Life Saved (Rs. million) 6.7* 3.7 9.7 2.2 14.7 
*Is calculated as the (total cost)/(total number of lives saved). Simple average is Rs. 8.6 million. Note: Benchmark operation assumes 85% capacity 










Table 5. Summary Statistics – 30 Plants with Highest SO2 Deaths 
  Average Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 1310 776 1260 248 3260 
Generation (GWh) 8643 6797 7378 103 26601 
Sulfur content of coal (%) 0.51 0.11 0.50 0.30 0.89 
SO2 emissions (tons/yr) 58963 37212 51568 13787 169192 
Sulfate Deaths per GWh 0.051 0.027 0.047 0.014 0.127 
Based on assumption of Benchmark Operations         
Sulfate Deaths 391 204 330 215 1083 
Capital Costs (Rs. crore) 1022 605 983 193 2543 
Annualized Capital Cost (Rs. crore) 154 91 148 29 384 
Operating Costs – Fixed (Rs. crore) 24 14 23 4 59 
Total Annual Cost (Rs. crore) 178 106 171 34 443 
Cost per Life Saved (Rs. million) 5.1* 3.5 4.3 1.6 14.7 
*Is calculated as the (total cost)/(total number of lives saved). Simple average is Rs. 5.5 million. Note: Benchmark operation assumes 85% capacity 










Table 6. Determinants of Cost Per Life Saved from FGD Installation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Cost per Life Saved Cost per Life Saved ln(Cost per Life Saved) 
        
Sea Water FGD -1.915** -1.161 -0.272*** 
  (0.904) (0.832) (0.0275) 
Nameplate (MW) 0.00368*** 0.000571   
  (0.000524) (0.000491)   
Deaths per ton of SO2 -763.3*** -769.5***   
  (72.76) (76.56)   
SO2 emissions (tons/yr) -7.04e-05***     
  (1.42e-05)     
Coal (kg/kWh)   -2.501*   
    (1.291)   
Coal Sulfur Content (%)   -468.7***   
    (115.0)   
ln(Nameplate)     0.0156 
      (0.0172) 
ln(Deaths per ton of SO2)     -0.999*** 
      (0.0164) 
ln(Coal (kg/kWh))     -0.631*** 
      (0.143) 
ln(Coal Sulfur Content)     -0.798*** 
      (0.0603) 
        
Observations 71 71 71 
R-squared 0.776 0.779 0.975 
Note: (1) Robust standard errors in parenthesis; (2) The regressions omit Korba STPS with an outlier estimate of cost per life saved of Rs 31 million 





Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis 
        










Life Saved  % Plants SO2 reduction Lives Saved 
      
 (Rs. 
million)   (million tons)   
Increase in average 
sulfur content of coal 
by 50% 5.5 25,400 4.0 99% 2.7 22,720 
Capital cost of wet 
FGD = 0.7 crore/MW 5.5 16,933 6.84 68% 1.57   11,780  
Cardiopulmonary 
Deaths             
Cardiopulmonary 
Mortality coefficient 3.3 10,365 9.8 50% 1.12 6,000 





Figure 1. Diagram of Limestone Gypsum FGD 
 
 












Figure 2. Coal-fired Power Plants – All Plants in Data 
 
 
Note: (1). Red Circles--Central Government owned power plants; Blue--State Government owned power 






Figure 3. Coal-fired Power Plants – Top 30 SO2 Emissions (Tons/Year) 
 
Note: (1). Red Circles--Central Government owned power plants; Blue--State Government owned power 
plants; and Purple—Privately owned power plants. (2) The size of the circles represents relative SO2 







Figure 4. Coal-fired Power Plants – Top 30 Sulfate Deaths 
 
 
Note: (1). Red Circles--Central Government owned power plants; Blue--State Government owned power 
plants; and Purple—Privately owned power plants. (2) The size of the circles represents relative number of 








Figure 5. Emissions and Deaths - Actual vs. Benchmark Operations 
 
Note: (1) Sorted by actual SO2 (tons/yr) emissions. (2) Benchmark operation assumes a capacity utilization 
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Figure 6. Emissions, Deaths and Costs of Lives Saved – 30 Plants with Highest SO2 
Emissions 
 
6a. Sorted by cost per life saved 
 
 
Note: (1) Figure 6 is sorted by SO2 (tons/yr) emissions based on benchmark operations; (2) Figure 6a is 
sorted by cost per life saved for FGD installation; (3) Benchmark operation assumes a capacity utilization 
of 85%. (4) The X-axis plots each plant, ranked by the mentioned variable; (5) The dashed green line is at 


















































































Figure 7. Emissions, Deaths and Costs of Lives Saved – 30 Plants with Highest Sulfate 
Deaths 
 
7a. Sorted by cost per life saved 
 
 
 Note: (1) Figure 7 is sorted by calculated (normative) sulfate deaths per year; (2) Figure 7a is sorted by 
cost per life saved for FGD installation; (3) Normative assumptions are capacity utilization of 85%. (4) The 
X-axis plots each plant, ranked by the mentioned variable; (5) The dashed green line is at Rs. 10 million, 




























































































































Table A1: Comparison of Pre-trend – Forced Outage 
 
Notes: (1) Estimates of Year*Phase dummy for the period 1988-1995; (2) Specifications control for EGU 
fixed effects. 
Table A2: Comparison of Pre-trend – Availability 
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Table A3: Comparison of Pre-trend – Capacity Utilization 
Notes: (1) Estimates of Year*Phase dummy for the period 1988-1995; (2) Specifications control for EGU 
fixed effects. 
 
Table A4: Falsification - Impact of Unbundling on Central EGUs 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4] 
  Availability Forced 
 
  Availability Forced 
 
            
[Unbundled] -1.516 -1.504       
  (2.276) (2.407)       
[Phase-I*Unbundled]       -1.845 -2.175 
        (3.306) (3.193) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled]       -0.681 0.196 
        (2.104) (2.515) 
            
Time Trend State State   State State 
Unit FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Notes: Std. errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equations 
control for a quadratic for EGU age, year and EGU fixed effects and state time trends. Number of 
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Table A5: Plant-level Clustering – Main Results 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
  DD DDD 





          
[Phase-I*Unbundled] 6.793** -5.110** 5.959* -4.938* 
  (2.699) (2.228) (3.165) (2.634) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled] -5.559** 1.599 -3.684 3.104 
  (2.476) (1.713) (2.758) (3.097) 
          
Observations 4,298 4,298 6,054 6,054 
R-squared 0.060 0.042 0.134 0.140 
# of Units 270 270 385 385 
Notes: Std. errors in parentheses, clustered at the plant level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. DD 
equations control for a quadratic for EGU age, year and EGU fixed effects and state time trends. DDD 
equations control for a quadratic for age and a full set of state*year, ownership*year, and EGU fixed 
effects. 
 
Table A6: Plant-level clustering – Robustness Results 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4] 
  Restricted Sample - DD   Restricted Sample - DDD 
  Availability 
Forced 
Outage   Availability 
Forced 
Outage 
            
[Phase-I*Unbundled] 6.141* -5.134**   7.398* -5.088 
  (3.263) (2.234)   (4.241) (3.235) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled] -8.501*** 1.434   -4.239 1.679 
  (3.131) (2.090)   (4.147) (4.200) 
            
Observations 2,895 2,895   4,024 4,024 
R-squared 0.077 0.053   0.166 0.182 
# of Units 147 147   203 203 
Notes: Std. errors in parentheses, clustered at the plant level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. DD 
equations control for a quadratic for EGU age, year and EGU fixed effects and state time trends. DDD 







Table A7: Wild Bootstrap-t Clustering 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 






          
[Phase-I*Unbundled] 6.793** -5.110** 5.959* -4.938** 
  (0.04204) (0.01201) (0.0742) (0.04404) 
[Phase-II*Unbundled] -5.559 1.599 -3.684 3.104 
  (0.13614) (0.53253) (0.118) (0.58258) 
          
Observations 4,298 4,298 6,054 6,054 
# of Units 270 270 385 385 
Notes: (1) P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (2) Clustering at the state level uses 
the Wild Clustering Bootstrap-t procedure outlined in Cameron et al. 2008. (3) Results based on 1000 
replications. (4) DD equations control for a quadratic for EGU age, year and EGU fixed effects and state 
time trends. (5) DDD equations control for a quadratic for age and a full set of state*year, ownership*year, 













B.1 Calculation of Emissions Estimates – Base Case 
The CEA Annual Report provides SPM emissions data for most Indian power 
plants in mg/Nm3, shown as a range (the highest and lowest actual readings during the 
year). For each plant, the midpoint of the range was converted into grams per second 
using the F-factors method given in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (see 40 CFR 
Part 60, Appendix A Method 19). The F-factors calculation is based on the ultimate 
analysis of the coal used. A short questionnaire based survey was conducted for NTPC 
plants in locations across India. Information on coal quality was obtained from 9 power 
plants—Rihand, Farakka, Badarpur, Singrauli, Talcher, Vindhyachal, Ramagundam, 
Korba and Dadri. As these plants use coal inputs from different coal mines in India, the 
average coal characteristics from these power plants is considered representative of the 
rest of the country. The F-factor calculation requires a value for the oxygen content of 
flue gas—this was taken as 4 percent (personal communication from CEA). The resulting 
emissions rate for SPM was converted to PM2.5 using data on particle size distribution 
from the U.S. EPA’s AP-42 methodology. 
Emissions of SO2 were estimated assuming that 7.5 percent of sulfur in the coal is 
retained in ash with all the rest emitted as SO2 (i.e., emissions of other oxides of sulfur 





Emissions of NOx were estimated by assuming a 200 ppm NOx concentration in 
flue gases (measured as NO2) for plants fitted with low-NOx burners and 300 ppm for all 
other plants. All units commissioned after 1996 are fitted with low NOx burners. 
B.2 Emissions and Economics – Coal Washing and FGD Cases 
The effects on emissions and generation costs of (a) using washed coal; and (b) 
retrofitting flue-gas desulfurization equipment were calculated. In both cases the effect on 
the levelized cost of electricity (lcoe) was estimated using a model of a representative new 
500 MW subcritical generation unit in India.92 Key assumptions are described below: 
 
a. Prior studies of the use of washed coal in India focus on economic impact—typical 
economic assumptions were provided by the CEA (private communication). An 
ultimate analysis of Dadri washed coal made for a USAID project93 was modified 
to be compatible with the yield/ash reduction data provided by the CEA. Washing 
Dadri coal reduces its ash content by 8 percent increases the lcoe by 17 percent (c.f. 
advice received from the CEA that washing increases generation cost by 15–20 
percent). 
 
This analysis (and the CEA’s) focuses only on the yield and direct operating costs 
of washing. Other researchers have found that the use of washed coal leads to 
92 Described in “What can an analysis of CDM projects tell us about the problem of cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions in India?” (http://www.webmeets.com/aere/2011/prog/viewpaper.asp?pid=421) by Partridge and 
Gamkhar; presented at the conference of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, June 
2011. 
93 See http://www.indiapower.org/igcc/standon.pdf. 
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significant gains in generation plant availability and plant load factor (PLF) and 
also to reductions in repair costs (see, for example, Zamuda and Sharpe 2007). My 
estimates take no account of these economic benefits, nor of likely rail freight 
savings. 
 
The impact of washing on PM2.5 emissions was estimated for an 8 percent reduction 
in coal ash content assuming that 80 percent of coal ash goes to fly ash, of which 
99.84 percent is removed by the ESP. These percentages are in line with CEA 
advice and, averaged over a sample of modern plants, are in line with actual 
emissions as reported by the CEA. The impacts on SO₂ and NOx emissions were 
estimated as described above. 
 
b. The Dahanu power plant in Maharashtra is currently one of three power plants fitted 
with an FGD. Information on its capital and operating costs and additional auxiliary 
power requirement is given in a regulatory case before the Maharashtra Electricity 
Regulatory Commission dated September 8, 2010. Based on these data, retrofitted 
FGD adds about 9% to the lcoe. The Dahanu FGD has very low operating costs as 
it employs sea water as the reactant to absorb SO₂ rather than purchased 
chemicals—a design that obviously can be employed only for a plant at a coastal 




instead taken as the average figure for the United States,94 the effect is to increase 
the lcoe by a further 6 percent. 
Table B1. Levelized Cost of Electricity in Various Plant Configurations (2010 Rs/kWh) 
500 MW plant with no FGD 1.134 
500 MW plant with FGD: O&M cost 
from Dahanu regulatory hearing 
1.233 
500 MW plant with FGD: O&M cost 
from EIA data for U.S. 
1.296 
500 MW plant with no FGD: coal 
washed to 30% ash content 
1.327 
Note:  Cost of electricity is calculated for a plant at a pithead location (i.e. no rail freight). The assumed 
coal price is the average Coal India Limited price for thermal coal in 2010, including royalty and similar 
charges but excluding value added tax.  
B.3 Estimation of Health Damages using Intake Fractions 
Zhou et al. (2006) used CALPUFF, a Gaussian dispersion model recommended by 
the U.S. EPA for long-range pollution transport studies95 to estimate the ambient 
concentrations of pollutants (primary particulates with equivalent diameters of 1, 3, 7 and 
13 µm; SO2; secondary sulfates; and secondary nitrates) across a wide area due to 
emissions from a point source. Separate CALPUFF runs were made for hypothetical 
identical generation plants at 29 locations in China. By combining the resulting matrices 
of concentration data with a gridded population data set, Zhou et al. estimated the 
population-weighted average human exposure to each pollutant within a domain measuring 
3,360 by 3,360 km (almost the whole of China) due to emissions from each source. The 
94 See http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sum.html (the EIA Electric Power Annual 2009). 
95 See http://www.src.com/calpuff/FR_2003Apr15.pdf. 
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exposure estimates were converted into intake fractions (defined as “the fraction of 
material or its precursor released from a source that is eventually inhaled or ingested by a 
population” (Zhou et al. 2006)) for each pollutant at each of the 29 locations. Zhou et al. 
then estimated regression models for each pollutant, with intake fraction as the dependent 
variable (see Table A2). The independent variables used in the final models were the annual 
rainfall at the plant and population living within concentric annuli centered on the plant (at 
100 km, 500 km and 1,000 km from the plant, and beyond 1,000 km but within the overall 
domain). R2s for these models ranged between 0.89 and 0.96.  
Zhou et al. did not use plant characteristics as independent variables as they 
assumed an identical plant at each location. However, they made a number of sensitivity 
analyses using alternative values for such variables as stack height. These alternative values 
made little difference to the results of the analysis, at least within the range (e.g., of stack 
heights) likely to be encountered at modern power stations.96 Sensitivities using different 
assumed emission rates for pollutants showed that estimated intake fractions remained 
reasonably constant (Zhou et al. 2006; Zhou et al. 2003).  
I used the Zhou et al. regression models to estimate intake fractions for primary 
PM2.5 and secondary sulfates and nitrates for actual plant locations in India. Population 
estimates (i.e., populations living within 100 km, 500 km and 1,000 km of each plant 
location) were made using the Landscan gridded population data set for 2008 maintained 
by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).97 The overall domain (used to estimate 
96 This is not quite true—runs using different stack heights found significant differences for large primary 
particles, but the impact of large particles on human health is limited. 
97 See http://www.ornl.gov/sci/landscan/.  
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population beyond 1,000 km) was taken as the whole of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
Sri Lanka. Estimates of annual rainfall are primarily from Indian data sources, but as these 
relate mainly to major cities and large towns, in several cases values had to be interpolated 
between locations reasonably close to a plant. 
The methodology and assumptions used for analysis of health impacts based on 
these estimated intake fractions are described in the text of the paper. 
Table B2. Matrix of Coefficients for Zhou et al. Regression Models 
  Distance of Exposed Population (Radius) 
Pollutant R2 0-100 km 100-500 km 500-1000 km >1,000 km Precipitation 
SO2 0.96 9.9E-08** 1.3E-08** 3.0E-09 1.8E-09** -6.3E-10 
PM1 0.96 1.5E-07* 2.3E-08** 1.1E-08** 3.9E-09** -1.7E-09** 
PM3 0.92 1.4E-07* 1.7E-08** 6.4E-09 3.0E-09** -2.4E-09** 
PM7 0.91 9.9E-08** 8.9E-09* 3.1E-09 1.5E-09* -1.2E-09** 
PM13 0.89 6.7E-08** 4.3E-09 9.4E-10 7.3E-10 -4.6E-10* 
SO4 0.95 2.4E-08 7.9E-09* 6.9E-09** 2.6E-09** -1.2E-09** 
NO3 0.93 4.3E-08 1.3E-08** 3.5E-09 2.5E-09** -1.9E-09** 
Source: (Zhou et al., 2006) 
Notes: ** Estimate significant at 0.05 level. 
* Estimate significant at 0.10 level. 
Population variables in millions; precipitation in mm/yr. 
 
B.4 Dose-Response Transfer for the Calculation of Health Impacts  
Deaths attributable to power plant emissions are calculated as follows: 
(1) Attributable deaths = (Attributable fraction of deaths) * (Baseline number of 
deaths) 
(2) Attributable fraction = (RR-1)/RR 





where ΔC = population-weighted average change in pollution concentration (in μg/m3) and 
β is the slope of the concentration-response function and RR is the relative risk. 
Dose-response transfer from Pope et al. (2002) gives a log relative risk value for 
cardiopulmonary mortality of 1.06 and β = .005827 (=ln(1.06)/10).98 The calculated β 
along with the concentration change (ΔC)99 is then used to determine the Attributable 
fraction (AF). In this example: 




The attributable fraction (AF) is the fraction of the baseline cardiopulmonary 
mortality that is attributable to emissions from power plants.  
The baseline deaths in Pope et al. are for ages 30 and over. Calculation of baseline 
deaths for this analysis uses the fact that total deaths above 30 in the study region (India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sril Lanka) were 7.181 million. Of this, approximately 41.7 per 
cent of the deaths were from cardiopulmonary diseases (Indiastat).100 
Baseline Deaths (from cardiopulmonary causes) = 7.181 million * 0.417 = 2.99 
million deaths 
Attributable deaths = AF * 2.99 million  
98 Using the cardiopulmonary coefficient for the 1979-83 period, when air pollution in the US was higher 
than in the 1999-2000 period. 
99 In the analysis, the ΔC for each plant allows the calculations to be done on a plant-by-plant basis. 
100 The proportion for India is applied to the region (which includes Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) 
since data is not available for the other countries. 
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